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TAX POLICY AND STOCKHOLDER ABDICATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In formulating tax policy, Congress and analysts have largely ig-
nored the deleterious effect on corporate productivity of the sepa-
ration of stock ownership from actual control of a public corpora-
tion. As a result, tax provisions intended to increase corporate
productivity and motivate beneficial managerial behavior have
been ineffective and in some cases counterproductive.
Since the stock market crash of 1929, which augured the
Great Depression and prompted the classic work by Berle and
Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property,' it has been
generally recognized that management's ability to control publicly
held corporations can negatively affect corporate productivity be-
cause management objectives may differ significantly from the
general wealth maximization objective of stockholders. Commenta-
tors have generally viewed the ability of management to control
the corporation as resulting from stockholder abdication which
they have in turn attributed to defects in the mechanics of corpo-
rate governance.2 Congress has responded to the problem of
stockholder abdication in part by the adoption of the federal
proxy rules.- Moreover, Congress has enacted or considered en-
acting various tax provisions with three goals in mind: (1) to en-
courage management to adopt objectives consistent with
stockholders' objectives, (2) to encourage stockholders to adopt a
long-term perspective with respect to their stock ownership, and
(3) to discourage management from insulating itself from the
discipline of market forces.
1 ADOLPH A. BERE & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (1933).
2 See, eg., ROBERT C. CLiARK, CORPORATE LAW 390-400 (1986) (discussing economic
incentive for stockholders to sell rather than incur the expense of a proxy battle with
management); Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers In Corporate Governance,
73 CAL L REV. 1671, 1683 (1985) (blaming the courts for having "limited or eliminated
the shareholders' ultimate authority over structural decisions via an expanded definition
of 'business judgment'"); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unijng Ownership and Control in
the Public Coporation, 1989 Wis. L REv. 881, 903 (1989) (discussing deficiencies in federal
regulation of proxies); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the
Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L REV. 3, 43-55(1988) (discussing structural problems
with respect to stockholders voting against management proposals).
3 The federal proxy rules, however, have not been very effective in empowering
stockholders to battle management. See e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access To The
Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L REV. 37 (1990); Dent, supra note 2, at 881.
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This Article will show, however, that these tax provisions have,
for the most part, been counterproductive and contradictory. Con-
gressional sensitivity to problems arising from the separation of
ownership from control has been, at best, incomplete. Congress
has repeatedly considered provisions for enhancing corporate
productivity without fully considering their impact on the separa-
tion of ownership from control issue. In particular, this Article will
show that Congress has considered the capital gains preference,
the incentive stock option preference, the golden parachute excise
tax, and the greenmail excise tax as methods to motivate produc-
tive stockholder and managerial behavior without fully analyzing
the impact of stockholder abdication on the effectiveness of these
provisions.
4
This Article also analyzes the effects of tax policy on the sepa-
ration of ownership from control in public corporations. It sug-
gests that tax policy may be a significant contributor to stockhold-
er abdication and, therefore, that the consideration of the separa-
tion of ownership from control in public corporations should be a
routine part of tax policy analysis.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II describes the im-
pact that stockholder abdication can have on corporate produc-
tivity. Part III discusses the mechanisms that cause stockholder
abdication. Part IV examines the proposals for a preference for
long-term capital gains in order to discourage stockholder abdica-
tion of control and shows that such a preference would be coun-
terproductive and actually encourage abdication. Part V then dis-
cusses other tax provisions which Congress has adopted to influ-
ence managerial behavior in order to remedy problems arising
from the separation of ownership from control. Congress has
utilized incentive stock options to encourage management to
adopt objectives more consonant with those of stockholders and
has adopted "golden parachute" and "greenmail rules" to discour-
age certain managerial behavior. Part V shows that those provi-
sions are at best ineffective, and sometimes counterproductive.
4 Several tax benefits have also been created to encourage employee stock option
plans (ESOPs). See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 415(c)(6), 404(k), 133, 1042 (West Supp. 1992). Be-
cause Congress intended to use ESOPs to influence employee behavior, rather than man-
agement behavior, ESOPs are beyond the scope of this article. It is interesting to note,
however, that the ESOP provisions have been frequently used by management to achieve
its own purposes rather than to benefit employees. &e, e.g., 2 BORIS I. B rIKER & LAW-
RENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs, 1 62.1.4 (2d ed.
1990).
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Finally, Part VI concludes by recommending that corporate control
issues be routinely considered in analyzing business tax proposals
and by suggesting some areas in which such analysis may prove
particularly helpful.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PRODUcIVITY
It has long been observed that management of publicly held
corporations controls the corporations with relatively little interfer-
ence from stockholders.' This separation of ownership from con-
trol adversely affects corporate productivity because management's
objectives frequently differ from stockholders', objectives.6 Since
management receives the bulk of its compensation from labor,
management's objectives usually involve strategies to protect their
jobs and maximize their compensation.7 On the other hand, an
important objective of stockholders is to receive an adequate re-
turn on their investment.8 Management's activity in protecting
their jobs and maximizing their compensation can often reduce
the corporation's profitability and' thereby decrease the
stockholders' return on their investment.
It is important to note that management is not entirely free
to pursue its objectives at the expense of stockholders. Manage-
ment discretion is partially constrained by competing products
which could cause the demise of the corporation (and manage-
ment jois) if the firm does not stay relatively competitive.9 Simi-
larly, the threat of a hostile takeover (the market for control) can
partially restrain management." Moreover, the importance of re-
5 See, eg., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1; Andrei ShIcifer & Robert W. Vishny, Man-
agement Entrenchment, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 123 (1989)
6 See, e-g., Eugene F. -Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Contro4
26 J. LAW & ECON. 301, 303 (1983).
7 Id.
8 Profit maximization is not the sole objective of stockholders. It is unlikely that
stockholders want profits to be maximized at the expense of human dignity or the envi-
ronment. However, receiving a "fair" return on their investment is an important objective.
9 Oliver D. Hart, The Market Mechanism As An Incentive Scheme, 14 BELL J. ECON. 366
(1983). T. Boone Pickens, Jr., Takeovers: A Purge of Poor Managements, 77 MGMT. REv. 52
(1988).
10 David S. Scharfstein, The Disciplinay Role of Takeovers, 55 REv. ECON. STUD. 185
(1988); Alfred Rappaport, The Staying Power Of The Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV.
Jan.Feb. 1990, at 96,100. Management can deflect the impact of takeovers by adopting
strategies to entrench itself. Thus, management can cause the corporation to adopt poi-
son pills or to recapitalize by replacing stock with debt. Moreover, the expense of take-
overs and the recent collapse of the junkbond market which financed takeovers further
negate the efficacy of takeovers. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the
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tamining a good reputation in order to maintain job mobility is
another ameliorating factor.1
However, these market forces still leave a great deal of room
for management to maneuver because management has been able
to devise strategies to shield itself from their full force. 12 Manag-
ers of publicly held companies are still able to engage in many
practices that feather their nests at the expense of stockholders.
Indeed, one commentator has suggested "the disenfranchisement
of all shareholders by rapacious management with kept boards of
directors-some paid consultants to the very same corpora-
tions-has cost shareholders billions upon billions.
" 13
It is difficult to quantify the impact of the separation of own-
ership from control on corporations. It has been suggested that
the large premiums paid by management in management buyouts,
in some cases 50 percent in excess of the stock value prior to the
buyout, are suggestive of the magnitude of the cost of the separa-
tion of ownership from control since a management buyout largely
eliminates the problem by making management the corporation's
controlling stockholders. 4 Others have suggested that the cost of
separation of ownership from control may approximate 20 percent
of the value of companies by analogy to the fact that closed-end
mutual funds often sell for 20 percent less than the value of their
portfolio of stock." The remainder of this Part will describe the
manner in which management's achievement of its own objectives
negatively affects productivity.
Outside Director An Agenda For Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 870-871 (1991).
11 Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firr, 88 J. PoL ECON. 288,
297-298 (1980); Steven N. Kaplan & David Reishus, Outside Directorships and Corporate Per-
formance; 27 J. FIN. ECON. 389 (1990) (finding that top executives of companies who
reduce dividends are 50 percent less likely to receive additional outside directorships than
are top executives of companies that do not reduce their dividends).
12 Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 5, at 122.
13 MARTIN SOSNOFF, SILENT INVESTOR, SILENT LOSER 6 (1986). See Alfred F. Conard,
Beyond Managerialism Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117, 122-126 (1988).
14 Donald H. Chew, Introduction: The Choice of Management Incentives in Corporate Re-
structurin& in CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION xvii, xx-xxi (Joel
M. Stern et al. eds., 1989).
15 Note, Greenmail" Targeted Stock Repurchases And The Management-Entrenchment Hypothe-
sis 98 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1985).
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A. Nonproductive Managerial Activities
1. Excessive Compensation
Management compensation is a good example of how the
conflict between management's and stockholders' objectives affect
corporate productivity. While stockholders prefer that management
compensation be closely correlated to the value created by
management's services, management generally prefers as much
compensation as quickly as possible. Most corporations form a
compensation committee composed of outside directors in an
effort to control management compensation. 6 However, the fail-
ure of stockholders to closely monitor directors has resulted in fre-
quent director abdication of control to management. Since 63
percent of all outside directors on the boards of America's 1,000
largest companies are chief executives of other firms17, the abdi-
cation of the board of directors should be expected. Chief execu-
tives who serve as directors for companies other than their own
are generous in establishing the salaries of management of those
companies because the high salaries can then be used to justify
large salaries from their own companies.'"
The result of managerial control is that although production
workers' income increased less than 50 percent from 1980 to
1989, compensation paid to chief executives increased over 150
percent in the same period.19 Indeed, comparisons to foreign
executives are unflattering to United States management. In the
United States, the average chief executive officer's income is 35
times more than the average manufacturing employee's while in
Japan the ratio is only 15 to 1 and in Europe 20 to 1.20 If the
stockholders had more control over the firm, increases in man-
agement compensation would presumably be more in line with
that of production workers.2 '
The disparity between management and worker income affects
corporate productivity in several ways. Inflated salaries increase the
16 Dana Wechsler Linden & Vicki Contavespi, Incentivze Me, Please, FORBES, May 27,
1991, at 208.
17 JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES 18 (1989).
18 A Surmy of Capitalism, THE ECONOMIST, May 5, 1990, at 10.
19 Id
20 Joani Nelson-Horchler, The Pay Revolt Brews, INDUS. WK., June 18, 1990, at 29, 80.
21 See Arch Patton, Those MilliomDollar-A-Year Executives, HARV. Bus. REV. , Jan.-Feb.
1985, at 56, 60-62.
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cost of production. And perhaps more importantly, inflated execu-
tive salaries lead to low worker morale.' Lastly, management's
quest for ever larger compensation causes it to focus on maximiz-
ing the sales or growth of corporations rather than long-term
profitability, because management's compensation is more closely
correlated to the size of the firm than to the profitability of the
firm.2 Management's pursuit of strategies that maximize sales
and growth of companies often comes at the expense .of long-term
profitability.24
2. Risk Aversion and Diversification
Other more subtle conflicts also negatively affect corporate
productivity. Management may be more risk averse than stockhold-
ers with respect to corporate activities because management's
wealth is concentrated in its contractual relationship with the cor-
poration.25 This position differs from that of public stockholders
who usually have a small concentration of their wealth in any
single corporation. Consequently, management will select corpo-
rate strategies which protect their concentration of wealth, but
which may be harmful to stockholders. For example, it has been
shown that in order for management to preserve their jobs, they
will select projects for which the expected income flow is smaller
but less erratic than income to be derived from riskier projects.26
This may result in a wealth transfer from stockholders to bond
holders with the result that stockholders are actually paying for
22 Nelson-Horchler, supra note 20, at 34; The Greed and the Gloiy of Being Boss, THE
ECONOMIST, June 17, 1989, at 79, 80.
23 Robin Marris, A Model of the "Managerial" Enterrise, 77 Q. J. EcoN. 185, 187
(1963); Joseph W. McGuire et al., Executive Incomes, Sales and Profits, 52 AM. ECON. REv.
753, 760 (1962); Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An
Empirical Analysis, 7 J. AccT. & EcoN. 11, 11-12 (1985).
24 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWrH 46-48 (rev.
ed. 1967) [hereinafter BUSINESS BEHAVIOR]; WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND
OPERATION ANALVIs 383-85 (4th ed. 1977) [hereinafter ECONOMIC THEORY]; GORDON
DONALDSON, MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH, 22-23 (1984); ROBIN MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC
THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL" CAPITAUSM 65-66 (1964); Yakov Amihud & Jacob Kamin, Reve-
nue vs. Profit Maximization. Differences in Behavior by the Type of Control and by Market Power,
S. ECON. J. 838-40 (Jan. 1979); Oliver E. Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business
Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 1032, 1047, 1051 (1963).
25 John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS 78, 84-85 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988) [here-
inafter KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS]; Yakov Amihud et al., 'Managerialism, 'Ownerism'
and Risk, 7 J. BANKING & FIN. 189, 190 (1983).
26 Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction As A Managerial Motive For Conglomer-
ate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605-606 (1981).
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management's increased job security.27 On the other hand, if
management jobs are threatened as a result of a hostile takeover,
management is more willing than stockholders to increase the risk
associated with the company by incurring excessive debt in order,
to preserve their jobs. Since managers are more interested than
stockholders in preserving their jobs, they are willing to incur
greater risk than stockholders in preserving their jobs.2"
It is also frequently asserted that managers favor diversification
of a corporation's lines of business in order to decrease the risk
of losing their jobs in the event one line of business becomes un-
profitable.' Corporate diversification has been statistically linked
to the nature of ownership of the corporation. Studies have com-
pared the incidence of conglomerate type mergers and acquisi-
tions (e.g., mergers with or acquisitions of businesses that are not
related to the acquirer) of "manager controlled firms" with "owner
controlled" firms. The "manager controlled firms" were defined as
firms with widely dispersed ownership over which no shareholder
or group exerted significant control. The "owner controlled firms"
were defined as firms for which ownership was concentrated. The
management controlled firms were found to engage in a signifi-
cantly larger number of conglomerate mergers than the owner
controlled firms.'
°
While these strategies reduce the risk associated with
management's employment, they can have a negative effect on
stockholder wealth. Studies that analyzed the effect of the diver-
sification of firms in the 1960s show that the diversified firms
suffered below average profitability in the 1970s."l Similarly, stud-
ies that focused on data from the 1980s demonstrate that diversify-
ing acquisitions tended to reduce the stock value of the diversify-
ing corporation. 2 Lastly, a recent study shows a direct statistical
27 Id.
28 Edward S. Herman & Louis Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Take Ouers,
in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS, supra note 25, at 215.
29 GORDON DONALDSON & JAY W. LoRSCH, DECISION MAKING AT THE ToP 8 (1983);
Amihud & Lev, supra note 26, at 605; Coffee, supra note 25, at 83; Shleifer & Vishny,
supra note 5, at 125; Note, The Conflict Between Managers and Shareholders in Diversifying
Acquisitions: A Portfolio Theory Approach, 88 YALE LJ. 1238, 1241-44 (1979).
30 Amihud & Lev, supra note 26, at 612-615.
31 DAVID J. RAvENScRAFr & F. M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC EF-
FIcENcY 111 (1987).
32 Randall Morck et al., Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. FIN. 31,
44-47 (1990). In this regard, one study has found that the more stock of the buyer held
by management (thereby decreasing the separation of ownership from control), the more
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relationship between firm diversification and reduced productivi-
ty.' The study found in an analysis of over 17,000 corporate fac-
tories that the greater the number of industries in which the cor-
porations owning the factories operated, the lower the productivity
of the factories as measured by the cost of units produced.'
B. Focus on the Short-Tem
A distressing result of stockholder abdication is that manage-
ment has an economic incentive to focus on the short-term and
will, in fact, focus on the short-term without stockholder moni-
toring. In studying the period 1960 through 1976, Professors
Hayes and Abernathy found that United States industrial produc-
tivity increased annually at 1.7 percent, while West Germany's
increased at a rate of 4.2 percent per year and Japan's productivity
increased annually at a rate of 7.5 percent.s5
Professors Hayes and Abernathy suggest that the relatively
poor performance in United States productivity is partly attribut-
able to the American style of management which motivates middle
management to focus on the short-term. They state:
American managers have increasingly relied on principles
which prize analytical detachment and methodological elegance
over insight, based on experience, into the subtleties and com-
plexities of strategic decisions. As a result, maximum short-term
financial returns have become the overriding criteria for many
companies.
As more companies decentralize their organizational struc-
tures, they tend to fix on profit centers as the primary unit of
managerial responsibility. This development necessitates, in
turn, greater dependence on short-term financial measurements
likely that the acquisition will increase the value of the buyer. Wilbur Lewellen et al.,
Merger Decisions and Executive Stock Ownersidp In Acquiring Firns, 7 J. Accr. & ECON. 209,
209 (1985).
33 FRANK R. LICHTENBURG, INDUSTRIAL DE-DIVERSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
FOR PRODucrrrY 28-31 (National. Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
3231, 1990).
34 Id. at 13-15, 28-29.
35 Robert H. Hayes & William J. Abernathy, Managing Our Way To Economic Decline,
HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1980, at 67, 69. Hayes & Abernathy studied the period
1960-1978. For the period 1980-1990 manufacturing productivity increased 3.6% in the
United States, 5.5% in Japan, and 1.8% in West Germany. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAX'N, 102D CONG., 1sT SESS., FACTORS AFFECTING THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETTrvENESs
OF THE UNITED STATES 19 (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter FACTORS AFFECTING COMPETI-
TVENssl.
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like return on investment [ROI] for evaluating the perfor-
mance of individual managers and management groups. In-
creasing the structural distance between those entrusted with
exploiting actual competitive opportunities and those who must
judge the quality of their work virtually guarantees reliance on
objectively quantifiable short-term criteria.'
Other commentators have joined Professors Abernathy and Hayes
in suggesting that part of the blame for United States productivity
problems is short-sighted management
7
The utilization of short-term financial objectives, such as annu-
al profits to measure the performance of middle management,
creates a strong incentive for the managers to maximize short-term
annual profits at the expense of long-term profits." For example,
it has been shown that increases in research and development ex-
penditures contribute to productivity growth." However, since a
research and development expenditure is deducted from gross
revenues when calculating profits for financial accounting purpos-
es,' the incentive for a manager to incur the expense is minimal
because the research will only generate profits in the future4 '
36 Hayes & Abernathy, supra note 35, at 70; see also ROBERT B. REICH, THE NEXT
AMERICAN FRONTIER 144 (1983) ("Professional managers concentrate on month-to-month
profit figures, data on growth in sales, and return on investment."); S. Prakash Sethi &
Nobuaki Namiki, Factoing Innovation Into Top Management's Compensation, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS, Winter 1986, at 22.
37 See ROBERT H. HAYES & STEVEN C. WHEELWRIGHT, RESTORING OUR COMPETITION
EDGE 5 (1984); LESTER C. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOLUTION 149-50 (1985).
38 Dennis E. Logue, Shareholder Wealth and Management Compensation, CORP. Accr.,
Winter 1984, at 38; Sethi & Namiki, supra note 36, at 22; Andrew Tylecote, Time Horizons
of Management Decisions: Causes and Effects, 14 J. ECON. STUD. 51, 58 (1987). As an alterna-
tive to annual bonuses, many firms reward middle management through promotion. See
Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM.
ECON. ASS'N PAPERS & PROC. 323, 323 (1986). This also encourages short-term profit
maximization because the middle manager anticipates that he or she will have different
responsibilities shortly as the result of promotion. Id.
39 FRANK R. LICHTENBERG & DONALD SIEGEL, THE IMPACT OF R&D INVESTMENT ON
PRODUcI~vrr-NEw EVIDENCE USING LINKED R&D-LRD DATA 16 (National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research Working Paper No. 2901, 1989).
40 STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 2 (Oct. 1974) generally
requires that research and development costs be expensed.
41 James R.. Repetti, LongTerm Capital Gains, the Long-Term Investment Perspective, and
Corporate Productivity, 49 TAX NOTES 85, 95 (1990). See generally MICHAEL L DERTOUZOS ET
AL, MADE IN AMERICA REGAINING THE PRODUCTIVE EDGE 64-65 (1989); David F. Larcker,
Shodt-Term Compensation Contacts and Executive Expenditure Decisions: The Case of Commercial
Banks, 22 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALsIS 33, 47-49 (1987) (finding that adoption of
annual bonus plan based on annual net income is correlated with "modest" decreases in
discretionary expenditures).
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when the manager may have moved to another job. Reportedly,
one-third to one-half of all United States managerial office workers
change their job every year. In contrast, the average annual turn-
over rate in Western Europe is 12 percent and in Japan, 6 per-
cent.42
Studies have shown that the adoption of compensation plans
which provide deferred compensation for the accomplishment of
long-term (3 to 6 years) objectives result in substantial increases in
capital investment.43 Moreover, evidence exists that stockholders
want management to focus on the long-term. For example, stock
prices react positively to announcements by corporations of the
implementation of long-term managerial compensation plans. 44
The stock market also reacts strongly to tangible evidence of long
range planning by management.4 Indeed, a study that examined
the effect of announcements of increased research and develop-
ment expenditures found that the stock market, on average, re-
sponded favorably to the announcement, even when the earnings
of the corporations making the announcements were declining.4
Despite the evidence that stockholders want management to
focus on the long-term, chief executive officers employ short-term
financial ratios to measure the accomplishments of lower level
management because it increases the chief executives' job mobili-
ty.47 It has been reported that managers of foreign competitors
42 Reich, supra note 36, at 163. See also ROBERT E. HALL, THE IMPORTANCE OF LIFE-
TIME JOBS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No. 560, 1980).
43 Elizabeth Jenkins & Robert E. Seiler, The Impact of Executive Compensation Schemes
Upon the Level of Discretionary Expenditures and Growth In Stockholder Wealth, 17 J. Bus. FIN.
& ACcT. 585, 588-89 (1990); David F. Larcker, The Association Between Performance Plan
Adoption and Corporate Capital Investment, 5 J. Accr. & ECON. 3 (1983).
44 James A. Brickley et al., The Impact of Long Range Managerial Plans On Shareholder
Wealth, 7 J. Accr. & ECON. 115, 116, 123-27 (1985). Stock prices also appear to react
positively to the adoption of short-term compensation plans. See, e.g., Hassan Tehranian &
James F. Waegelein, Market Reaction to Short-Term Executive Compensation Plan Adoption, 7 J.
AccT. & ECON. 131, 141 (1985) [hereinafter Market Reaction]; Hassan Tehranian & James
F. Waegelein, Short-Term Bonus Plan Adoption and Stock Market Performance-Proxy and Indus-
try Effects: A Note; 21 FIN. REV. 345, 352 (1986). The positive reaction does not mean that
the market prefers short-term compensation plans to long-term plans, but rather suggests
that the market reacts favorably to any plan that will more closely align management
with stockholders. See Market Reaction, supra, at 141.
45 Su Han Chan et al., Corporate Research and Development Expenditures And Share Value,
26 J. FIN. EcoN. 255, 274-75 (1990); John J. McConnell & Chris J. Muscarella, Corporate
Copital Expenditure Decisions And The Market Of The Firm, 14 J. FIN. EcON. 399 (1985).
46 Chan et al., supra note 45.
47 Rappaport, supra note 10, at 99-100; Repetti, supra note 41, at 95.
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are amazed by the rate at which management changes jobs in the
United States.' The use of financial ratios helps to decrease
management's employment risk by making their skills appear more
versatile. Because the methodology of focusing on financial ratios
is not industry specific, chief executive officers can quickly move
from corporation to corporation or industry to industry.49 This
increased job mobility contributes to the reluctance of chief execu-
tive officers to encourage middle management to focus on the
long-term because mobility of the chief executives in the
short-term will be increased by short-term profits.5"
C. Inefficient Retention of Earnings
The separation of ownership from control also causes firms to
retain earnings excessively and utilize those earnings inefficiently.
Public corporations that are controlled by management because
stock ownership of the corporations is widely disbursed retain a
higher percentage of earnings than firms for which control is not
separated from ownership.51 There are several explanations for
this phenomenon. First, the retention of earnings as opposed to
their distribution enables management to finance diversification of
the firm's lines of business. Management favors diversification in
order to reduce the likelihood of their jobs being terminated in
the event one line of business becomes unprofitable. 2 Moreover,
the retention of earnings benefits management because increases
in the size of the firm are statistically correlated with increases in
management compensation." Managers prefer to retain earnings
rather than resort to outside capital to finance diversification and
growth in order to avoid subjecting themselves to the discipline
(perhaps in the form of a high cost of capital) of the capital mar-
kets. 5
4
48 HAYES & WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 37, at 10; Ryohei Suzuki, Worldwide Expansion
of U.S. Exports - A Japanese View, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Spring 1979, at 67-70.
49 Hayes & Abernathy, supra note 35, at 74.
50 Repetti, supra note 41, at 95. See generaly REICH, supra note 36, at 165.
51 Williamson, supra note 24, at 1047-51.
52 DONALDSON & LORSCH, supra note 29, at 8; Amihud & Lev, supra note 26, at 605-
06; Coffee supra note 25, at 83; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 5, at 125; Note, supra
note 29, at 1243.
53 Marris, supra note 23, at 187; McGuire et al., supra note 23; at 753; Murphy,
supra note 23, at 11-12.
54 Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agenty-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV.
650, 655 (1984); Jensen, supra note 38, at 323; Michael S. Rozeff, Growth, Beta and Agency
Costs as Deteminants of Dividend Payout Ratios, 5 J. FIN. RES. 249, 250-51 (1982).
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As discussed earlier, several studies have shown that the diver-
sification of a firm's business has a negative effect on corporate
profits,55 stock value, 56 and factory productivity.57 Another study
has focused on the financial return that a firm earns in investing
its retained earnings without regard to the nature of the invest-
ment.58 The study found that the rate of return realized by pub-
lic corporations on the investment of retained earnings ranged
from only 3.0 to 4.6 percent, while the return on the investment
of borrowed funds ranged from 4.2 to 14 percent and on newly
issued stock from 14.5 to 20.8 percent. 9 The authors of the
study subsequently reformulated their analysis in response to criti-
cisms of their methodologyw and found that the return on re-
tained earnings for firms that issue new equity compared favorably
with the returns on debt and equity, but that firms which issued
insignificant amounts of new equity had a rate of return of zero
on the retained earnings.1 This indicates that firms which are
not disciplined by the process of regularly seeking funds from the
capital market are inefficiently investing retained earnings.
III. WHY STOCKHOLDERS ABDICATE CONTROL
TO MANAGEMENT
The ability of management to pursue its own objectives results
from stockholder abdication. Stockholder abdication in turn arises
from the confluence of a number of factors related to corporate
governance.
Under the existing form of corporate governance, stockhold-
ers elect directors, who are charged with the duty of managing the
corporation. However, the notion that stockholders "elect" direc-
55 RAVENSCRArr & SCHERER, supra note 31, at 111.
56 Morck et al., supra note 32, at 45-47. In this regard, one study has found that
the more stock of the buyer held by management (thereby decreasing the separation of
ownership from control), the more likely that the acquisition will increase the value of
the buyer. Lewellen et al., supra note 32, at 209.
57 LICH'TENBURG, supra note 33, at 28-29.
58 William J. Baumol et al., Earnings Retention, New Capital and the Growth of the Firm,
52 REV. EcoN. & STATS. 345 (1970).
59 Id. 353.
60 See, e.g., Irwin Friend & Frank Husic, Effidency of Corporate Investment, 55 REV.
ECON. & STATS. 122-27 (1973); G. Whittington, The Profitability of Retained Earnings, 54
REv. ECON. & STATS. 152-60 (1972); .
61 William J. Baumol et al., Efficiency of Corporate Investments. Reply, 55 REV. EcON. &
STATS. 128-31 (1973); See Merritt B. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A
DYNAMIC ECONOMY 233-37 (1987) (reviewing the literature).
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tors is somewhat misleading for public corporations because the
candidates for directorships are nominated by the current direc-
tors.6 2 The current directors are not required to include other
nominees on the company's proxy. statement.' Thus, stockhold-
ers wishing to propose alternate candidates can do so only at the
considerable expense of preparing their own proxy statements."
The candidates proposed by incumbent directors are generally
comprised of the company's chief executives, the so-called inside
directors, and individuals who have no affiliation with the compa-
ny, normally referred to as outside directors. Although one of the
roles of outside directors is to provide a perspective more conso-
nant with the view of stockholders than that of the inside direc-
tors, the outside directors normally possess no great loyalty to the
stockholders who "elect" them. Sixty-three percent of all the out-
side directors on the boards of America's 1,000 companies are
chief executives of other firms.' Thus, the sentiments and objec-
tives of the outside directors are likely to be more closely aligned
with the company's management than its stockholders.'
Supporting the natural proclivity of directors to defer to man-
agement is the tendency of stockholders to refrain from pressing
their views on management. This state of stockholder abdication
has been formalized into the "Wall Street Rule," which states that
a stockholder who is displeased with management should sell rath-
er than try to persuade management to alter its activities.67 The
cost associated with influencing management has promoted this
rule.' For example, consider a stockholder who owns one per-
cent of the stock of a corporation and who opposes a transaction
62 See Barnard, supra note 3, at 38-39; Joel Seligman, A Sheep in Wof's Clothing. The
American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325,
331 (1987).
63 17 C.F.R. § 240 14a - 8 (c)(8) (1991).
64 See Barnard, supra note 3; Lynne L Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance:
Beyond Bere and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 19, 35, 96. See also Buxbaum, supra note 2,
at 1682 (discussing inadequacies in federal and state law with respect to stockholder
nomination of directors); Ralph C. Ferrara, Current Issues Between Corporations and Share-
holders: Federal Intervention into Corporate Governance, 36 Bus. LAW. 759, 762 (1981).
65 LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 17, at 18.
66 Indeed, even those directors who are not officers of the company or other com-
panies may be naturally predisposed to defer to management because they lack
management's expertise. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256
(7th Cir. 1986) rev'd on other grounds, 107 S.Ct. 1637; Victor Brudney, The Independent
Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 609-16 (1982).
67 Louis LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WrrH WALL STREEr 91 (1988).
68 Id. See also MIcHAEL T. JAcOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERicA 43 (1991).
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proposed by management. If the stockholder feels that the transac-
tion will reduce the value of the firm by $1 million, the stock-
holder might invest up to $10,000 to fight management's proposal
assuming a 100 percent probability of success. There are, however,
no guarantees of success in the forum available under corporate
law for stockholders to express disagreement with management
without selling their stock-a proxy battle-and, therefore, the
stockholder will have to discount the expected value of success.
Suppose, for example, that there is only a 40 percent chance of
success. The expected value to the stockholder of winning the
proxy contest would then be only $4,000 (40% x $10,000) and the
stockholder would be willing to pay only $4,000 to combat man-
agement.
Indeed, a 40 percent chance of success is overly generous. In
an examination of 96 proxy battles occurring during 1962 to 1977,
a study found that dissidents won only 20 percent of the time.0
One of the reasons that dissident stockholders have such a low
success rate in proxy battles is that the governance of corporations
is extremely cumbersome. Most corporate transactions do not
require approval by stockholders." Moreover in most public cor-
porations, the stockholders do not have the power to adopt a
resolution which simply orders management to follow or refrain
from following a particular course of action. 7' The directors are
given the power to manage the corporation on behalf of the
stockholders, and it is the directors who in theory direct the activi-
ties of management. Consequently, the only option for a dissident
stockholder is to elect a new group of directors who disagree with
management.
This task is difficult because in publicly held corporations,
most stockholders do not attend stockholder meetings. Instead,
they sign proxies which permit the person designated in the proxy
to vote their shares.72 Thus, the dissident stockholders will have
to collect more proxies than the incumbent directors in order to
69 Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Govemance A Study of Proxy Contests,
11 J. FiN. ECON. 401, 434 (1983).
70 The reason for this was eloquently set forth by Professor Buxbaum:
A large organization, whatever its mission, cannot achieve its goals by constituting its
members into an ongoing committee of the whole. Even participatory democracies,
worker-owned enterprises, on cultural revolutions except the distinction between mass and
cadre, wherever they may at times draw the line between the two.
Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 1671.
71 CLARK, supra note 2, at 94.
72 Id. at 360.
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elect new directors. This can be very expensive. If management
dominates the current board of directors (which is likely to be the
case since the directors are allowing management to effect the
transaction), then management in effect controls proxy voting
because corporate law generally permits the board of directors to
use corporate funds to solicit proxies.7" The dissident stockhold-
ers will have to possess financial resources sufficient to match the
corporation's resources. Consequently, the expense of attempting
to replace the board with new directors less sympathetic to man-
agement is likely to be much higher than a stockholder would be
willing to incur.74
Obviously, it might behoove the stockholders to act collec-
tively in sharing the expense of the proxy battle. However, the
economics of the situation are again tilted against stockholder
action because a classic "free-rider" problem exists. A stockholder
sympathetic to a dissident stockholder's cause is not required to
contribute to the expenses of the proxy battle. Indeed, a rational
stockholder may decide not to finance the battle because, regard-
less of the result, the abstaining stockholder is better off than the
participating stockholders. If the stockholders who participate in
financing the proxy fight win, the abstaining stockholder benefits
without having incurred any cost. On the other hand, if the dis-
senting stockholders lose, the abstaining stockholder is financially
better off than the dissenters because the dissenters have incurred
out of pocket the proxy battle expense, while the abstainer has
not.
75
The expense and uncertainty of proxy battles cause stockhold-
ers to view stock as essentially a commodity76 representing an in-
choate claim to a portion of the net cash flow of the corpora-
tion.7" Many stockholders do not view stock ownership as pro-
73 Dent, supra note 2, at 903.
74 The stockholder will be reimbursed only if (1) the reimbursement is ratified by a
majority of stockholders; (2) the contest is for corporate policy rather than corporate
control; and (3) the expense were reasonable both in nature and amount. CLARK, supra
note 2, at 395.
75 &e MICHAEL BACHARACH, EcONOMIcs AND THE THEORY OF GAMEs 61-64 (1977);
CLARic, supra note 2, at 392-93. It has been noted that the "situation is like the prisoner's
dilemma of game theory and may call for solutions similar in strategy to those that
would solve that dilemma." Id. at 393 (footnote omitted).
76 JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREsr AND MONEY
147-64 (1936); LOWENSrEIN, supra note 67, at 45; Repetti, supra note 41, at 96; see also
JACOBS, supra note 68, at 31.
77 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Roe of a Targets Management
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viding any meaningful opportunity to exert significant influence
on management and, as a result, are unwilling to incur any ex-
penses in monitoring, let alone influencing, management."8 Al-
though stockholder abdication, as formalized in the Wall Street
Rule, may represent rational behavior for individual stockholders,
its collective effect is harmful. Management has been able to di-
vert resources away from productivity because of the lack of stock-
holder vigilance.
Recently, institutional investors, such as pension funds, have
shown more concern with management behavior. Institutional
investors have started to demand more outside directors,7 9 stock-
holder review of poison pill defenses and golden parachute con-
tracts," and the implementation of secret ballots.8 ' In 1988, in-
stitutional investors owned 47 percent of the equity of the 1000
largest corporations in the United States, as measured by stock val-
ue. 2 However, while the number of resolutions relating to cor-
porate governance that were sponsored by institutional investors
and shareholders groups doubled from 1989 to 1991,0 the total
number of such resolutions is still small-153 for the 1991 proxy
season.' Moreover, the number of victories is smaller still. In
1990, only 13 resolutions sponsored by institutions or shareholder
groups were approved.8
The paucity of proposals and even fewer victories suggest that
the increased activity of institutional investors may not resolve the
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L REV. 1161, 1171 (1983); Fama & Jensen, su-
pra note 6, at 302-03.
78 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 68, at 95-96.
79 Timothy D. Schellhardt, More Directors Are Recruited From Outside, WALL ST. J., Mar.
20, 1991, at B1.
80 James A. White, Shareholder-Rights Movement Sways a Number of Big Companies, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 4, 1991, at C1.
81 Id.
82 Institutional Investors and Corporate America. Conflicts and Resolutions: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the Sen. Comm. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 15 (1989) (statement of Carolyn K. Brancato). Others have suggested that insti-
tutional ownership of America's 1000 largest companies may approximate 66%. Peter
Drucker, Management and the World's Wo, HARV. Bus. REv. 65, Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 71. For
a discussion of 'the various estimates of the percentage of stock held by institutions, see
LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 17, at 3 n.8; A.A. Sommer, Jr., Corponate Governance In the
Nineties: Managers vs. Institutions, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 357, 361-62 (1990).
83 American Investors Getting Uppity, THE ECONOMIST, March 16, 1991, at 76, 80.
84 White, supra note 80, at C16. White reports that more than one-half of the 153
proposals were introduced by members of United Shareholders, which was founded by T.
Boone Pickens, Jr. in 1986. Id.
85 American Investors Getting Uppity, supra note 83, at 80.
[Vol. 67:971
TAX POLICY AND STOCKHOLDER ABDICATION
separation of ownership from control problems. Institutional inves-
tors confront the same economic problems discussed above with
respect to engaging in a proxy battle.' Very few institutions sin-
gly own controlling interests in public corporations. Indeed, most
institutions are prohibited by law from owning controlling interests
in corporations.'7 National banks and state chartered banks that
are members of the Federal Reserve System are prohibited from
owning stock, except as trustees.' In addition bank holding'com-
panies cannot own more than 5 percent of the voting stock of a
nonbank company.' Mutual funds cannot refer to themselves as
"diversified" if they own more than 10 percent of the stock of any
company.' Mutual funds are also restricted by tax provisions
which limit the extent to which they can hold significant amounts
of stock in other corporations.9' Insurance companies are usually
limited by state law as to the size of their investments in other
companies.92 Lastly, pension funds, while not subject to explicit
restrictions, may feel compelled by the prudent person rule to
avoid owning a large percentage of stock in a single company that
may be rendered illiquid by section 10(b) or 16(b) consider-
ations.93
,86 See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder
Adivisn, 79 GEO. LJ. 445, 464, 469 (1991).
87 For insightful discussions of legal restrictions on institutions owning stocks or
exercising control in corporations, see Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined,
89 MICH. L REV. 520, 530-62 (1990); Rock, supra note 86, at 476-78; Mark J. Roe, A
Political Theory of American Coiporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L REV. 10 (1991).
88 California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 366-67 (1897); National Bank Act of
Feb. 25, 1863, § 11, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988); Banking Act of 1933, § 5(c), 12 U.S.C.
§ 335 (1988); see Roe, supra note 87, at 17.
89 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 4(c)(4)-(5), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6)
(1988); see Roe, supra note 87, at 18.
90 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (1988); see Roe,
supra note 87, at 19.
91 I.R.C. § 851(b)(4) states that a mutual fund will not be taxed as a flow-through
entity unless:
(4) at the close of each quarter of the taxable year-
(A) at least 50 percent of the value of its total assets is represented by
(ii) . .. securities limited ... in respect of any one issuer to an amount not greater in
value than 5 percent of the value of the total assets of the taxpayer and to not more
than 10 percent of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer, and
(B) not more than 25 percent of the value of its total assets is invested in the securi-
ties . . . of any one issuer ....
I.R.C. § 851(b)(4) (West Supp. 1992).
92 Roe, supra note 87, at 22-23.
93 Id. at 26-27; Black, supra note 87, at 545-48. Indeed, if an investor is deemed to
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Given that most institutional investors are forbidden or dis-
couraged from owning controlling interests in corporations, the
same free-rider problems discussed above apply. Institutions cannot
be viewed as a single actor in the securities market. Rather, each
will seek to achieve the objectives of its own owners' (or, more
likely, of its management)." Why should one institution incur
the expense of a proxy battle when all others will benefit without
having incurred the expense?
It might be argued that because there are fewer institutional
investors than individual investors it is easier for the institutional
investors to organize. Consequently, it could be asserted that insti-
tutional activism will cure stockholder abdication. But, legal imped-
iments exist to concerted action. 6 A group of investors that owns
5 percent or more of a corporation is required to file Form 13D
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Form 13D identi-
fies the members of the group, their plan of action, and their
sources of financing." Institutions may naturally prefer to avoid
making these disclosures. Moreover, the mere act of contacting
fellow institutional stockholders with the intent of influencing
management may be a proxy solicitation which would itself neces-
sitate the use of Schedule 14A." Thus, the expense of preparing
Schedule 14A would have to be incurred prior to determining
"control" a corporation, it can only safely sell securities by filing a registration statement
or pursuant to the safe harbor of Rule 144 or Rule 144A. Securities Act of 1933,
§§ 2(11), 4(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(11), 77d(1) (1988); Rule 144(e)(1), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144(e)(1) (1991); Rule 144A(b), id. § 230.144A(b). Moreover, a person who "con-
trols" a corporation can be held liable for the company's securities laws violations. Se-
curities Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988). The term "control" is defined as the "power to direct or cause
the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the owner-
ship of voting securities ... or otherwise." Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1991); Rule
12b-2, id. § 240.12b-2; sm Black, supra note 87, at 548; Conard, supra note 13, at 162.
94 Sommer, supra note 82, at 362; see infra note 180.
95 Rock, supra note 86, at 469-76.
96 Roe, supra note 87, at 26; see also JACOBS, supra note 68, at 47-50 (arguing that
administrative positions adopted by the FTC have discouraged institutional activism).
97 Rule 13d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1991); Rule 13d-5(b)(1), id. § 240.13d-5(b)(1);
see Conard, supra note 13, at 162; Roe, supra note 87, at 26.
98 See Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Roe, supra
note 87, at 26. The SEC has recently proposed amendments to stockholders to commu-
nicate with others stockholders about pending proxy solicitations without filing proxy
statements so long as the communicating stockholder does not have a material economic
interest in the outcome of the proxy solicitations, does not seek a proxy and requests an
authorization or consent. Proposed Rule 14a - 2[b][1], 56 Fed. Reg. 28,998 (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposed June 25, 1991).
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whether fellow institutional investors are even interested in the
initiative.
The legal impediments against institutional control of corpo-
rations and the legal bias against joint action by institutions is not
merely the result of random and haphazard statutory enactments.
Rather, Professor Roe has suggested that it represents .the political
bias in the United States against the concentration of power in
financial institutions.' The bias against concentrated power is in
sharp contrast to the concentration which exists in Japan and
Germany."° In Germany, for example, where the law facilitates
the transfer of voting rights by stockholders to banks which man-
age their portfolios, three banks hold the voting rights for approx-
imately 43 percent of all portfolios. 1 Japan also has ownership
highly concentrated in financial institutions. A study that examined
135 Japanese corporations found that 28 percent of the stock of
those corporations was held by stockholders owning 5 percent or
more of the corporation.° 2 In contrast, the study found that on-
ly 7.5 percent of the stock of large, United States corporations is
owned by stockholders owning 5 percent or more of a company's
stock.0 ' Moreover, stockholder monitoring of management is
further strengthened in Japan by virtue of the "Keiretsu," a volun-
tary association of corporations and banks that engage in business
relationships with one another and that own stock in one anoth-
er.
104
While the fragmentation of the power of financial institutions
may be appropriate for a democratic society, it has inflicted a cost
on the efficiency of corporations. Fragmentation leads to less ef-
fective stockholder control of management in the United States
99 Roe, supra note 87, at 31-45.
100 I& at 59-60.
101 Hermann H. Kallfass, The American Corporation and the Institutional Investor Are
There Lessons From Abroad?,. 1988 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 775, 782-83 (1988); Martin Lipton
& Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quiniquennial Election of
Directon, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 187, 220 (1991); Roe, supra note 87, at 60.
102 WILLIAM G. OUCHI, THE M-FoRM SocIETY 74 (1984); Roe, supra note 87, at 59-60.
103 OUCH, supra note 102, at 74.
104 JOHN Sco'rr, CAPITALISr PROPERTY AND FINANCIAL POWER 164-83 (1986); Lipton &
Rosenblum, supra note 101, at 219; J. Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers in Japan: Opportunism,
Ideology and Corporate Controt 35 UCLA L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1987); Aron Viner, Mergmr, Ac-
quisritions and Corporate Governance in Japan, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 27
(Joseph C. F. Lufin & David Gallagher eds., 1990); see also JACOBS, supra note 68, at
67-68 (discussing role that Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the
Ministry of Finance play in monitoring management).
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than in Germany or Japan. This has probably contributed to man-
ufacturing productivity growing at an average of only 3.0 percent
per year during the period 1960 through 1990 in the United
States, while averaging 4.1 percent in West Germany and 7.6 per-
cent in Japan.
0 5
IV. HOLDING PERIOD REQUIREMENTS AND USING
THE TAX SYSTEM TO INFLUENCE STOCKHOLDER
BEHAVIOR-THE LONG-TERM CAPITAL GAINS
PREFERENCE
Tax policymakers have dealt haphazardly with the negative
effects of the abdication of responsibility by stockholders. As dis-
cussed below, Congress has sought to encourage greater stockhold-
er responsibility through the holding period requirements. More-
over, as discussed in Part V, Congress has attempted to relate
more closely the objectives of management with those of stock-
holders by encouraging management stock ownership through
incentive stock option plans. Also as explained in Part V, Congress
has tried to prevent management from shielding itself against the
take-over market by enacting golden parachute and greenmail
rules.
A. Introduction to Issues Pertaining to the
Long-Term Capital Gains Preference
The average daily volume of stock sold on the New York
Stock Exchange increased from 46.9 million shares in 1981 to
156.8 million in 1990.1' Institutional investors account for ap-
proximately fifty percent of the trading on the stock ex-
change. 10 7 Some have suggested that the increased turnover of
stocks reflects the tendency of investors to focus only on the
short-term. 08 They argue that the short-term focus of investors is
harmful for the United States economy because it forces manage-
ment to focus on short-term profits while sacrificing the long-term
competitiveness of their business. This failure to focus on the
long-term has taken the form of decreased funding for research
105 FACrORS AFFE~rING COMPEITFIVENESS, supra note 35, at 19.
106 NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1990 NYSE FAcT BOOK 78 (1991).
107 Id. at 15.
108 Statement of Dennis E. Ross before the Sen. Fin. Comm., repinted in BNA Daily
Tax Report, March 15, 1989, at L-4; Statement of Sen. Nancy L Kassebaum on Senate
Floor (Sept., 21, 1989) (Tax Notes Doc. 90-2019); LOWENSTEIN, supra note 67, at 42-43.
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and development and has contributed to a decline in domestic
productivity."° Thus, it has been suggested that tax incentives
should be used to encourage a longer holding period. Specifically,
proponents of these measurements have suggested reenacting a
significant preferential tax treatment of long-term capital gains"0
or imposing a tax on the short-term gains of tax-exempt organiza-
tions such as pension funds and university endowments.
However, the discussion of holding periods as a mechanism to
encourage stockholders to adopt a long-term perspective so that
management can concentrate on the long-term, has not focused
sufficiently on three problems. First, a preference for long-term
capital gains is not needed to motivate stockholders to adopt a
long-term perspective. As discussed below, stockholders already
have a strong economic incentive to want management to maxi-
mize long-term profits regardless of how long stockholders plan to
hold their investments. Second, the discussion has largely failed to
note that a capital gains preference will, at least conceptually,
encourage the inefficient retention by corporations of their profits
and exacerbate stockholder abdication. Third, even assuming that
stockholders need encouragement to permit management to adopt
a long-term perspective, holding period requirements only encour-
age investors to hold stock for the requisite holding period and
that period may at best correspond only randomly with the period
needed by management to implement long-term plans. This ran-
dom correlation is not costless because holding period require-
ments impose efficiency costs on the securities market.
B. Short-Term Investors Should Not Want
Management to Maximize Short-Term Profits at
the Expense of Long-Term Profits
An analysis of the economic forces shaping the expectations
that investors will have for management behavior has to distin-
guish between investors who invest for their own account and
institutional investors who invest on behalf of someone else.
109 Statement of Dennis E. Ross, supra note 108. For an excellent discussion of this
view, see Ellin Rosenthal, Pension Investment Taxes: W A Sacred Cow Beef Up U.S. Competi-
tliveness?, 46 TAX NoTES 1364 (1990).
110 Currently, capital gains of individuals for capital assets held more than one year
are taxed at a slightly preferential rate of 28%. I.R.C. § 1(h) (West Supp. 1992). The
maximum nominal rate for ordinary income of individuals is 31%. Id. § 1 (a).
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1. Investors Investing for Their Own Account
Rational investors who trade stock for their own account in
seeking short-term gains should not want management to maxi-
mize short-term profits at the expense of long-term profits because
management's failure to maximize long-term profits should impair
the ability of the short-term investors to sell at a gain.
11
'
Standard financial theory holds that the price of a security is
determined by the market based upon the present value of all ex-
pected cash flows that the security will generate." 2 The expected
future cash flow will arise from two sources: (1) assets in place,
and (2) assets in which the firm invests for the future." Obvi-
ously, if a buyer expects that future cash flows will be large, the
buyer will be more likely to value the security at a higher price. If,
on the other hand, the buyer thinks the current cash flow has
been created at the expense of future cash flows, the buyer will
adjust the valuation downward. Consequently, a trader who pur-
chases stock on one day for resale the next day will still want
management maximize long-term profits (or at least create the ap-
pearance of maximizing long-term profits) so that the price the
trader receives on resale will reflect the maximum possible valua-
tion.
111 Donald W. Kiefer, The Security Transactions Tax=" An Overview of the Issues, 48 TAx
NOTES 885, 893-94 (1990); Repetti, supra note 41, at 89.
112 See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 49-52 (3d ed. 1988); THOMAS E. COPELAND & J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THE-
ORY AND CORPORATE POLICY 544-64 (3d ed. 1988).
It is important to note that the stock market is not always an accurate calculator of
stock values. Several commentators have observed that stock prices occasionally vary from
the discounted present value of expected cash flows. See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock
Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends? AM. ECON. REV.,
May 1981, at 421-36; Kenneth D. West, Dividend Innovations And Stock Price Volatility, 56
ECONOMETRICA 37 (1988). Moreover, it should be noted that there are several theories
about the manner in which taxation of the cash flow at the stockholder level affects
stock valuation. See, e.g., James M. Poterba & Lawrence H. Summers, The Economic Effects
of Dividend Taxation, in RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE 227, 232-44 (Edward I.
Altman & Marti G. Subrahmanyam eds., 1985) (summarizing various theories about the
impact of the taxation of dividends). Further uncertainty about valuation is introduced
because of questions about the impact of macroeconomic factors such as interest rate on
the appropriate discount rate for calculating the present value of future distributions. See,
e.g., Nozar Hashemzadeh & Philip Taylor, Stock Prices, Money Supply, and Interest Rates: The
Question of Causality, 20 APPLIED ECON. 1603 (1988).
113 McConnell & Muscarella, supra note 45, at 400; Merton H. Miller & Franco
Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961).
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For example, suppose a trader has purchased a share of stock
in X Corp. which represents a claim of $100 per year of X Corp.'s
net cash flow for the next five years. It is anticipated that at the
end of five years, X Corp.'s cash flow will be zero because its
product will become obsolete (X Corp. does not engage in any
research and development) and X Corp.'s assets will be worthless
at that time. Trader will pay $379.08 for the share of stock, as-
suming an appropriate discount rate of 10 percent. Assuming that
the risk associated with X Corp. does not change and that there
are no changes in macroeconomic factors, such as inflation or real
interest rates, so that the discount rate does not change, a trader
will never be able to sell its share for more than the price it paid
of $379.08 because there is no rational expectation of increased
cash flow in the future.
Contrast the foregoing situation with one in which X Corp.
has engaged in research and development for new products. The
stock in X Corp. would be valued based on the correspondingly
reduced cash flow from the current product plus the expected
cash flow from new products to be developed. If, the market's
expectations about the results of research and development view
the new product development more positively after the trader has
bought X Corp. stock, the trader would make a profit. Of course,
the opposite is also true; if the market's expectations about the
fruits of the research and development turn negative after the
trader has purchased the security, the trader would have to sell
the security for less than he or she paid for it. However, if man-
agement is focused on maximizing long-term profits and selecting
the most promising products for future deyelopment, presumably
the probability of success will be somewhat higher than failure."
Consequently, even short-term traders should want management to
focus on the long-term.
It is interesting to note that studies have confirmed that the
stock market reacts strongly to tangible evidence of long range
planning by management."4  In an analysis of 547 an-
nouncements of increases in capital expenditures by 285 corpora-
tions pertaining to plant, equipment, and research and develop-
ment, one study found statistically significant evidence that the
stock market reacted positively to the announcement.1 5 Another
114 McConnell & Muscarella, supra note 45, at 419-21.
115 Id. at 405-21.
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study found that the stock prices of corporations which an-
nounced increases in research and development expenditures
increased on the average even where some of the corporations
had declining profits.116 Similarly, the market reacts favorably to
indications that management is being motivated to adopt the
long-term perspective. A study found a statistically significant corre-
lation between increases in stock prices and announcements by
corporations that they were implementing long-term compensation
plans which would motivate management to focus on the
long-term.
117
2. Rational Investors Who Do Not Invest For Their Own Account-
-Institutions-Should Also Want Management to Maximize
Long-Term Profits
A large class of investors do not invest for their own account.
Rather, these investors-institutions such as pension funds, mutual
funds and insurance companies-are managed by professional
managers who make decisions about the investment of money
which belongs to someone else. Most of the increase in trading in
the past fifteen years is the result of increased portfolio turnover
by institutional investment managers. 118
The propensity of institutional managers to chum their port-
folios is difficult to explain. A recent study examining the returns
on investment of 278 domestic stock funds over the past ten years
found that the 25 percent of the funds with the lowest turnover
performed significantly better than the average return for all funds
and performed slightly better than the 25 percent of the funds
with the highest turnover." 9 The study also found, however, that
the 25 percent of the funds which traded the most outperformed
the average for all funds. 2' The study suggests that although
buying and holding is the best strategy, it is only slightly more
profitable than a strategy of aggressive trading. 1 1
116 Chan et al., supra note 45.
117 Brickley et al., supra note 44, at 123-26.
118 Donald W. Kiefer, Lock-In Effect Within A Simple Model of Corporate Stock Trading, 43
NAT'L TAX J. 75, 79 (1990).
119 SeeJonathan Clements, Mutual Funds With Low Turnover Find Penny Saved Is Penny
Earned, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1990, at Cl (reporting on study performed by Morningstar,
Inc.).
120 Id
121 Id.
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One potential explanation for the propensity of investment
managers to chum their portfolios excessively is that such activity
achieves their personal objectives. For example, it has been sug-
gested that managers trade even when the information they have
does not justify such trading in order to create the appearance for
their customers that they have nonpublic information about cer-
tain securities." In addition, studies have shown that pension
fund managers are more aggressive in investment strategies than
employees investing their own money.12 Also, because compensa-
tion schemes for institutional investors are frequently tied to annu-
al investment return, rather than long-term investment perfor-
mance, it is possible that investment managers trade in an attempt
to maximize the annual return by capturing appreciation in their
portfolio selections.1 24
Regardless .of their personal motives for aggressive trading,
however, the institutional investment manager should still want
corporate management to maximize, or at least appear to maxi-
mize, long-term profits. This is because the price at which the
institution can sell the securities will depend upon the long-term
prospects of the corporate issuer.
It has been suggested that the short-term perspective of insti-
tutional stockholders may compel management to focus on the
short-term.125 Messrs. Lipton and Rosenblum have argued that
the short-term perspective of investors causes management to se-
lect projects with quick payouts instead of long-term payouts be-
cause the market is more likely to misvalue the long-term project
122 Brett Trueman, A Theory of Noise Trading In Securities Markets, 43 J. FIN. 83, 83-84,
88 (1988).
123 Fred Williams, Workers Cautious With Investments, PENsIONs & INVEsrMENT AGE, Apr.
15, 1985, at 35, 52-53; see also Franco Modigliani & Gerald A. Pogue, Alternative Investment
Performance Fee Arrangements and Implications for SEC Regulatoiy Policy, 6 BELL J. ECON. 127,
140 (1975).
124 DERTOUZOS ET Ai-, supra note 41, at 62. Defined benefit plans may also impose
pressure on investment managers to capture gain and "beat" the market because defined
benefit plans promise to pay their beneficiaries a fixed amount regardless of the income
of the plan. If the plan does not earn sufficient income, the employer has to make up
the difference. Consequently, employers may pressure investment managers to make su-
perior returns in order to avoid having to fund the defined benefit plan. This pressure
may contribute to the investment managers' propensity to churn. See THUROW, supra note
37, at 156-57, 213.
125 Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 101, at 208-09; see also, Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, The New Themy of the Firn-Equilirium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 148 (Papers and Proc. of the 102d Annual Meeting of the Am. Econ.
Ass'n 1990).
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and thereby misvalue the corporation's stock.16 Management
fears misvaluation of its corporation's stock in the form of under-
valuation because undervaluation can lead to a hostile take-
over. 127 Messrs. Lipton and Rosenblum base their argument on a
study that suggests the market is more likely to misprice the
long-term project because arbitrage (the act of trading on the
belief that the market price for an asset differs from its market
value) is less expensive for short-term assets than long-term as-
sets. 21 Since arbitrage is cheaper for short-term assets, more in-
stitutional 'arbitragers will focus on the short-term projects with the
result that the market valuation of short-term projects will be
more accurate than the market valuation of long-term pro-
jects.12
The problem with this argument is that it is based on infor-
mational asymmetry. 3 Arbitrage for long-term assets is more ex-
pensive primarily because the market does not receive enough
information about long-term projects 31 If stockholders were in a
position to observe all management activities, any action that maxi-
mized short-term profits at the expense of greater long-term prof-
its would lower stock prices.3 2 Conversely, if information about
long-term projects was made available to the market by manage-
ment, stockholders and arbitragers would more readily ascertain
the appropriate impact of the long-term project on stock prices.
Management could correct the informational asymmetry about the
long-term projects by simply disclosing the income projections for
the long-term project.
A strong argument exists that management does not disclose
the profitability of long-term projects because it prefers to focus
on short-term projects. 33 As discussed earlier, there are several
incentives for management to maximize short-term profits at the
126 Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 101, at 208-09.
127 Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 125, at 148.
128 Id
129 Id at 152.
130 See Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL ECON. 61,
62 (1988).
131 See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 125, at 149-50.
132 Stein, supra note 130, at 62.
133 Further, management may not disclose the profitability of long-term profits be-
cause of the potential negative impact on the competitive posture of the company as the
result of disclosing strategic plans. See Roger J. Dennis, Mandatory Disdosure Theory and
Management Projections: A Law and Economics Perspectiv4 46 MD. L. REv. 1197, 1212 (1987).
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expense of long-term projects. 1 4 Moreover, as discussed previous-
ly, several studies show that the market eagerly awaits suggestions
that management is maximizing long-term profits. 5 Consequent-
ly, a capital gains preference or imposition of a holding period re-
quirement is unnecessary. Regardless of the time horizon for inves-
tors, investors should want management to maximize or appear to
maximize long-term profits.
C. A Long-Term Capital Gains Preference
Encourages the Inefficient Retention of
Earnings and Exacerbates Problems Arising from
the Separation of Ownership from Control
The previous Section has shown that holding periods are not
needed to motivate stockholders to adopt a long-tem. perspective.
This Section illustrates that rather than remedy problems in corpo-
rate productivity, a long-term capital gains preference may actually
exacerbate problems. Conceptually, this would occur for two rea-
sons. First, a long-term capital gains preference will provide a
tax-related justification for management to retain corporate earn-
ings even though it may inefficiently invest those retained earn-
ings. Second, a long-term preference creates a tax bias for
noncorporate stockholders to realize profits of the corporations in
which they hold stock by selling their stock, rather than holding
their stock and receiving dividends. This bias may increase the
reluctance of stockholders to devote resources to monitoring man-
agement and, therefore, may exacerbate the separation of owner-
ship from control. Exacerbating the separation of ownership from
control would actually decrease, rather than increase, corporate
productivity.
1. Impact of Capital Gains Preference on Retained Earnings
One phenomenon arising from the separation of ownership
from control is management's propensity to retain earnings and
utilize them inefficiently. Firms that are controlled by management
retain a significantly higher percentage of earnings than firms for
which ownership and control are not separated."3 6 As discussed
134 See supra text accompanying notes 35-42 and 49-50.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
136 See, eg., BusiNEss BEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 46-48; ECONOMIC THEORY, supra
note 24, at 383-85; DONALDSON, supra note 24, at 22-23; MARRIS, supra note 24, at 64;
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earlier, management may prefer to retain earnings rather than
distribute them because distribution would force them to resort to
the capital markets for cash and subject themselves to monitoring
by those markets. 3 7 Moreover, the fact that increases in the size
of the firm are statistically correlated with increases in manage-
ment compensation provides an additional incentive to retain
earnings." Lastly, management may prefer retaining earnings to
finance diversification in order to decrease the risk of losing their
jobs in the event one line of business becomes unprofitable." 9
Management's propensity to retain earnings is not costless. As
discussed earlier, excessive retention of earnings can have a delete-
rious effect on productivity. 4 ° Reenacting a significant capital
gains preference would provide a tax-related justification for man-
.agement to retain earnings.' 41 Management could assert that div-
idends should not be 'distributed since they are taxed at a higher
rate than capital gains to noncorporate taxable stockholders.
4 2
Retaining earnings may permit stockholders to benefit from the
reduced capital gain rate by simply selling the stock and receiving
the value of the retained earnings at a reduced tax rate143 or
waiting for a liquidation distribution or redemption which qualifies
for capital gain treatment. Indeed prior to the temporary repeal of
the preference for long-term capital gains in the Tax Reform Act
Amihud & Kamin, supra note 24, at 838-46; Williamson, supra note 24, at 1047, 1051.
137 Easterbrook, supra note 54, at 655; Jensen, supra note 38, at 323; Rozeff, supra
note 54, at 250-251.
138 Marris, supra note 23, at 187; McGuire et al., supra note 23, at 753; Murphy,
supra note 23, at 11-12.
139 DONALDSON & LORSCH, supra note 29, at 8; Amihud & Lev, supra note 26, at 605,
612-15; Coffee, supra note 25, at 83; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 5, at 125; Note, supra
note 29, at 1241-94.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
141 See AMERICAN LAW INsTrTUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C 349-51
(1982); CHARLES E. MCCLURE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? 22 (1979);
Alan J. Auerbach, 'Capital Gains Taxation and Tax Reform, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 391, 397
(1989); Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration, the Proper Way to Eliminate the Corporate
Tax, 27 TAX NOTES 637, 641 (1985).
142 Corporations are generally entitled to a dividends-received deduction of 70% of
the amount of the dividend under I.R.C. § 243 (West Supp. 1992). Thus, corporate
stockholders will generally prefer dividends to capital gains since capital gains recognized
by corporations are currently taxed at the same rate as ordinary income. Id. § 1201(a).
The reasons that corporate stockholders do not demand increased dividends are discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 151-158.
143 This, of course, assumes that the price at which the stock could be sold reflects
the discounted present value of'the future distributions taxed at a preferential rate. See
infra note 184 for a discussion of the literature pertaining to the tax rate the market ac-
tually applies to anticipated distributions in valuing securities.
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of 1986,1" economists had a difficult time understanding why
corporations ever paid dividends.' Some have suggested that
taxes were irrelevant to dividend policies because marginal inves-
tors who determine the price of securities were able to avoid pay-
ing taxes on dividends and capital gains through the utilization of
pension funds and insurance contracts or because marginal inves-
tors were taxed at the same rate on dividends and capital
gains."4 Others have theorized that the different tax rate applied
to dividends, versus distributions taxed as capital gains, has no
impact on the decision to pay dividends because the decision to
pay dividends is based solely upon whether the corporation has
excess cash after financing its investment needs. 4 7 Still others
have suggested that, despite the heavy tax bias against dividends,
corporations pay dividends in response to stockholders' wishes to
impose on management the discipline of resorting to the capital
markets for additional financing 148 and because stockholders fear
that management will squander the retained earnings. 149
Certain "tax-favored" stockholders may also be partly responsi-
ble for corporations' payment of dividends. Corporations are enti-
tled to receive dividends at a reduced tax rate because of the
dividends-received deduction. 5 ' This treatment of dividends for
144 The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 raised the maximum tax rate for indi-
viduals to 31%. I.R.C. § 1(a) (West Supp. 1992). Because I.R.C. § 1(h) provides that the
maximum marginal rate on capital gains cannot exceed 28%, the Revenue Reconciliation
Act in effect reintroduced a preference for long-term capital gains. Id. § 1(h).
145 For thoughtful discussions of various explanations, see Sasson Bar-Yosef & Richard
Kolodny, Dividend Policy and Capital-Market Theory, 58 REv. ECON. & STATS. 181 (1976);
Poterba & Summers, supra note 112, at 232-44.
146 This is commonly referred to as the "tax irrelevance" view; see, e.g., Merton H.
Miller & Myron S. Scholes, Dividends and Taxes, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 333, 349-54 (1978); see
also Poterba & Summers, supra note 112, at 235-44 (summarizing the theories).
147 This is frequently referred to as the "new" or "tax capitalization view." See, e.g.,
Alan J. Auerbach, Wealth Maximization and the Cost of Capital 93 Q. J. ECON. 433 (1979);
David F. Bradford, The Incidence and Allocation Effects of Tax on Corporate Distributions, 15 J.
PUB. ECON. 1 (1981); see also Poterba & Summers, supra note 112, at 237-40, 265 (sum-
marizing the "new" view).
148 See, eg., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Hersh M.
Shefrin & Meir Statman, Explaining Investor Preference For Cash Dividends, 13 J. FIN. ECON.
253, 255-58 (1984). Others have also suggested that the payment of dividends conveys
additional information to stockholders about the prospects of the corporation. See, eg.,
Ramasastry Ambarish et al., Efficient Signalling with Dividends and Investments, 42 J. FIN.
321, 321-24 (1987).
149 Marshall E. Blume, Stock Returns and Dividend Yields: Some More Evidence, 62 REV.
ECON. & STATS. 567 (1980); Jean Crockett & Irwin Friend, Dividend Policy In Perspective:
Can Theory Explain Behavior?, 70 REV. ECON. & STATS. 603, 610-11 (1988).
150 I.R.C. § 243(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992) generally allows a corporation receiving a
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corporate stockholders is in stark contrast to capital gains, which
are taxed to corporate stockholders at the same rate as ordinary
income."' Thus, corporate stockholders may be partly responsi-
ble for the level of dividend payment that does occur. Moreover,
tax-exempt investors, such as qualified pension funds and universi-
ty endowments, may also pressure management for dividends since
the dividends will be entirely tax-free to them.
However, corporate and tax-exempt stockholders probably do
not in practice exert significant pressure on corporations to pay
dividends for two reasons. First, the transaction costs and "free
rider" problems of stockholder activism discussed earlier 5 2 out-
weigh any benefits associated with dividend income. Tax-exempt
investors can capture part of the benefit of earnings that are re-
tained by the corporation (rather than paid out as dividends) by
selling the stock of the corporation and thereby avoiding the
transaction costs of forcing a dividend.5 ' Similarly, although
stockholders taxed as corporations benefit from the
dividends-received deduction, the size of that benefit may not be
significant because of the alternative minimum tax imposed on
corporations. The dividends-received deduction is generally ig-
nored in calculating the alternative minimum tax for
corporations. 5 4 Second, management of corporate stockholders
has little incentive to compel other corporations to pay dividends
on common stock. To the extent corporations seek to benefit
from the dividends-received deduction, they probably purchase
preferred stock which has a higher probability of paying dividends
than does common stock. Usually, preferred stock provisions re-
dividend to deduct an amount equal to 70% of the dividend with the result that only
30% of the dividend is taxable income to the corporation. If the corporation receiving
the dividend owns 20% or more of the stock of the corporation paying the dividend, the
recipient corporation may deduct 80% of the dividend. Id. § 243(c)(1). If the corpora-
tion receiving the dividend and the corporation paying the dividend are members of an
"affiliated" group, as defined in § 243(b)(2), the recipient corporation may deduct 100%
of the dividend. Id § 243(a)(3). The benefit of the dividends-received deduction is par-
tially reduced by the fact that the dividends-received deduction is generally ignored in
calculating the alternative minimum tax for corporations. Id. § 56(g) (4) (C).
151 Id. § 1201(a).
152 See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
153 The tax-exempt investor can probably only capture part of the benefit of the re-
tained earnings. Studies suggest that the price at which the stock may be sold is deter-
mined by taxable investors who discount the value of the retained earning to reflect the
tax liability they will pay when they realize the benefit of the retained earnings. See infra
note 183 for a discussion of the literature pertaining to the tax rate the market actually
applies to anticipated distributions in valuing securities.
154 I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1992).
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quire that dividends be paid on the preferred stock before divi-
dends may be paid on the common stock. 55 When a corporate
stockholder holds sufficient dividend-paying preferred stock to
meet immediate cash flow needs, management will use the
corporation's investment in common stock for another purpose. If
income from corporate operations has not met the annual profit
objectives needed for additional management compensation, man-
agement can sell the common stock to generate additional in-
come. This ability to time the recognition of income for purposes
of calculating annual corporate profits (as well as taxable income)
may account for the failure of corporate stockholders (or more
pointedly, its management) to pressure corporations in which they
hold common stock to pay dividends on the common.
The tax benefit to noncorporate stockholders, including
noncorporate stockholders of mutual funds,15 arising from the
retention of earnings when a significant preference for long-term
capital gains exists is illustrated by. the following example. Assume
that all corporate ordinary income and individual ordinary income
is subject to the same tax rate of 30 percent, while capital gain
income is subject to a lower tax rate of 20 percent. Assume fur-
ther that a corporation has $100 of after-tax income. The corpora-
tion can either distribute this income currently as a dividend, or
retain the income and invest it in a project which yields 7 percent
after tax. Management would prefer to retain earnings to increase
the size of the corporation through diversification, thereby increas-
ing their compensation and reducing employment risk. If manage-
ment retains the $100 of earnings and invests in a project which
yields 10 percent of ordinary taxable income before tax (7 percent
after tax), the corporation would have $140.25 at the end of five
years. If that amount is then distributed in liquidation of the cor-
poration or in a form otherwise qualifying for capital gain treat-
ment under I.R.C. section 302,57 the stockholders would have
$112.20 after paying the capital gain tax.
155 See e.g., VICTOR BRUDNEY & MARVIN A. CHIREISrEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATE FINANCE 222-23 (3d ed. 1987).
156 Mutual funds which qualify as "regul~ted investment companies" are generally
taxed as flow-through entities. I.R.C. §§ 851, '852 (West Supp. 1992). Thus, long-term
capital gain income realized by the mutual funtd which is distributed to the stockholders
(or deemed to be distributed to the stockholders) is not taxable to the mutual fund and
is taxable to the stockholders as long-term capital gain. See id. § 852(b)(3).
157 I.R.C. § 302 (West 1988).
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If, instead, the corporation immediately distributes the $100 as
a dividend taxable as ordinary income at the assumed rate of 30
percent, the stockholders would have $70 of income to reinvest. If
they then invest that amount in an investment yielding 10 percent
of ordinary taxable income (7 percent after tax), they would have
$98.17 at the end of five years. Thus, under these facts, the stock-
holders would be better off letting the corporation accumulate the
income and distribute the earnings in a form eligible for capital
gain treatment since they would derive a net economic benefit.
Moreover, if the stockholders can in fact sell the stock for a price
reflecting the discounted present value of the distributions taxed
at the capital gain tax rate or some other "blended" rate which is
lower than the ordinary income tax rate,158 the stockholders
could realize immediately the benefit of the capital gains prefer-
ence without waiting for the distribution.
The accumulated earnings tax could possibly be applied to
the retained earnings and nullify the benefit to be derived from
the corporation's retention of earnings.'59 However, the tax is
not applied to earnings accumulated "for the reasonably antici-
pated needs" of the business."6 Applicable Treasury regulations
define "reasonable needs of the business" to include "bona fide
expansion of business."161 Management's desire to retain earn-
ings to increase the size of the business would, therefore, not
trigger application of the accumulated earnings tax so long as the
plans to expand are sufficiently "specific, definite and feasi-
ble." 62
The foregoing examples assumed that the maximum marginal
rate for corporations equalled the maximum marginal rate for
individuals. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the top corporate
marginal rate (34 percent) has been higher than the maximum
individual rate for ordinary income (28 percent for the period
1982 through 1990, 31 percent for 1991). Also, prior to 1991, the
same tax rate was applied to capital gains and ordinary income for
individuals. Thus, for the taxable years 1987 through 1990, there
158 Sea infra note 183 for a discussion of whether stock market prices reflect tax rate
differentials on different types of distributions.
159 Section 531 imposes a penalty tax of 28% on a corporations retained earnings
that are not necessary to fund the reasonably anticipated needs of the business. I.R.C. §
531 (West Supp. 1992).
160 I.R.C. §§ 533(a), 537(a) (West 1988).
161 Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b) (1) (as amended in 1986).
162 Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(b) (as amended in 1986).
[Vol. 67.971
TAX POLICYAND STOCKHOLDER ABDICATION
was a tax incentive to distribute dividends on a regular basis, as-
suming that the effective tax rate for corporations was similarly
higher than the effective tax rates for individuals and that individ-
ual stockholders had the same investment opportunities as the
corporations."t However, this incentive may have been partially
offset by the benefit that stockholders realized from deferring
corporate distributions to a time that taxation of the distribution
will be minimized.1 4 It is nevertheless interesting that one study
has concluded the percentage of corporate profits paid out as divi-
dends rose significantly in the years immediately following the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.'r
For taxable years beginning in 1991, the maximum marginal
rate on corporate income (34 percent) remains higher than the
maximum tax rate on ordinary income for individuals (31 per-
cent). However, capital gains of individuals are now taxed at only
28 percent. The reinstatement of a small preference for capital
gains has the effect of once again encouraging retentions of cor-
porate earnings, even though corporate tax rates are higher than
163 See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Recent Corporate Restnucturing And the Corporate Tax System,
42 TAx NOTES 715, 716 (1989). For example, consider a corporation with an effective tax
rate of 30% and its stockholders with an effective tax rate of 10%. Assume that the cor-
poration has $100 which it can distribute to stockholders or retain in a project which
yields 10% before tax. If the corporation retains the $100, at the end of 5 years it will
have $140.25. If that amount is distributed to the stockholders, they will have $126.22 af-
ter they pay their 10% tax.
On the other hand, if the corporation immediately distributes the $100 to the
stockholders, they would have $90 to invest in a project which yields 10% pretax. Be-
cause the stockholders' income is taxed at a rate (10%) which is lower than the corpo-
ration, at the end of 5 years the stockholders will have $138.48, an amount greater than
the amount they would have if the corporation had retained the $100.
When the stockholder has an effective tax rate of zero, such as tax-exempt organiza-
tions, there will be an even stronger incentive to distribute earnings, unless of course
that corporation's return on investment is significantly larger than other investment op-
portunities available to the tax-exempt organization.
164 See Kenneth R. Ferris & William R. Reichenstein, A Note On The Tax-Induced Clien-
teke Effect And Tax Reform, 41 NATL TAX J. 131 (1988).
165 ROGER H. GORDON & JEFFREY K. MACtUE-MASON, EFFECTS OF THE TAx REFoRM
Acr ON CORPORATE FRNANciAL PoLicy AND ORCANIZATONAL FORM 25 (National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 3222, 1990). It is difficult to ascertain, however,
whether this increase was attributable to the repeal of the large capital gains preference
which existed prior to the Tax Reform Act or to the increase of the maximum marginal
rates for corporations to an amount greater than individual rates. The study by Gordon
and Mackie-Mason focused on the increase in the capital gains rate as an explanation for
the increased pay out of earnings. Id. at 20-25. But see Stephanie Abrutyn & Robert Turn-
er, Taxes and Fir's Dividend Policies: Surey Results, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 491, 495 (1990)
(reporting that 85% of companies surveyed did not intend to increase dividend payments
in response to the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
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individual rates. For example, consider a corporation which earns
$1,000 of income and assume that the income is subject to the
maximum corporate rate of 34 percent. Assume further that the
corporation's individual stockholders are subject to the maximum
individual rate of 31 percent on ordinary income (including divi-
dend income) and 28 percent on capital gain. The corporation
will pay a tax of $340 on the $1,000 of income, leaving the corpo-
ration with $660.
If the corporation distributes the $660 as a taxable dividend,
the stockholders will pay a tax of $204.60, leaving a net $455.40
for the stockholders. If the stockholders then invest the $455.40 in
a one-year investment which yields 10 percent pretax to the stock-
holders, the stockholders will have a net after-tax income of
$31.42,'" resulting in the stockholders having $486.82 after one
year.
Contrast this with what happens if the corporation retains the
$660 and invests it in a one year project which yields 10 percent
pretax. At the end of one year, the corporation would earn $43.56
after tax, 167 leaving the corporation with a total of $703.56 ($660
+ 43.56). If the corporation then distributes the $703.56 in a trans-
action which qualifies for capital gain treatment,"6 or the stock-
holders are otherwise able to realize the value in the corporation
through a sale, the stockholders would have $506.56 after tax. 69
Because the stockholders obtained only $486.82 when there was a
current distribution versus $506.56 when the corporation retained
and reinvested the distribution, the stockholders would generally
prefer retention.
If the earnings are retained for a sufficiently long period,
however, the higher tax rate applied to corporate income will
eventually negate the advantage of the lower rate for capital gains.
In the above example, the stockholders would be better off with a
current distribution which is taxable as a dividend if the corpora-
tion intends to retain the earnings for more than approximately
fifteen years.17 However, it is important to note that the reten-
166 Pretax investment income of $45.54 (10% of $455.40) less tax of $14.12 (31% of
$45.54) results in $31.42 of after-tax income.
167 Pretax investment income of $66.00 ($660 x 10%) less income tax of $22.44
(34% of $66) results in $43.56 of after-tax income.
168 Such as a redemption described in I.R.C. §§ 302(a) or 303(a) (West 1988).
169 The receipt of $703.56 by an individual stockholder in a transaction in which the
entire $703.56 was recognized as capital gain would cause the stockholder to pay tax of
$197 (28% of $703.56) leaving $506.56.
170 This is calculated by setting up the following simultaneous equation where (1)
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tion of earnings by the corporation permits the taxpayer to time
the recognition of the retained earnings in years when he or she
may be subject to an effective tax rate even lower than the 28
percent capital gain rate, or to defer tax on the retained earnings
until death."' Thus, a stockholder could benefit even if the
earnings in the above example are retained for more than fifteen
years because of the advantage in selecting the time at which the
stockholder would realize the corporation's earnings at a tax rate
lower than 28 percent. 72
2. Impact of Capital Gains Preference on Stockholder Abdication
The previous section has shown that if a significant capital
gains preference is adopted, taxpayers will be more predisposed to
permit management to retain earnings so long as they can realize
the value of those retained earnings at the preferential rate by
selling their stock.1 7 This may exacerbate stockholder abdication
in two ways. First, the preferential tax rate for capital gains moti-
vates taxable stockholders to be more tolerant of management
inefficiency in investing retained earnings.174 Recall an earlier ex-
ample"7 in which we assumed that all corporate and individual
ordinary income was subject to the same tax rate of 30 percent
while capital gain was subject to a lower tax rate of 20 percent.
We saw that where a corporation distributes as a dividend $100 of
its after-tax income to a noncorporate stockholder, the stockholder
will have $70 after tax. If the stockholder invests that $70 amount
the net after tax return to the stockholder assuming a current dividend distribution of
the $660 to the stockholder and investment of that amount for N years equals (2) the
net after tax return to the stockholder assuming capital gain treatment for the retention
of the $660 for N years by the corporation and then calculating the value of N:
660(1.069)N(.69) = 660(1.066)N(.72)
The above equation assumes, of course, that the stockholder has investment opportunities
that will yield a pretax return to the stockholder equal to the pretax return of invest-
ments available to the corporation.
171 I.R.C. § 1014(a) (West 1988) permits a deceased stockholder's estate to step up
the basis in the stock to the stock's fair market value.
172 See generally Ferris & Reichenstein, supra note 164, at 134.
173 It is important to note that even without the preferential tax rate, our current
unintegrated system of taxing the distribution of corporate profits still contains a bias
against distributions because taxable stockholders can time their sale of stock in low tax
years, thereby minimizing their tax liability for the retained earnings. See id. at 131.
174 See MCCLURE, supra note 141, at 148-49. See also Eric M. Zolt, Corporate Taxation
After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A State of Disequilibrium, 66 N.C. L REV. 839, 844 (1988).
175 See supra text accompanying notes 156-158.
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in an investment yielding 10 percent pretax (7 percent after tax),
the stockholder will have $98.17 after tax at the end of five years.
Contrast this $98.17 result with the amount the stockholder
would receive if the corporation, instead of distributing the $100
as a dividend, retained the $100 and invested it on a project that
has the same level of risk as the 10 percent yielding investment
available to the stockholder, but that yields only 8 percent pretax
(5.6 percent after tax). The corporation will have $131.32 after tax
to distribute at the end of five years. If the distribution qualifies
for capital gain treatment, the stockholder would pay a tax at the
rate of 20 percent and have $105.05 after tax. In effect, the capi-
tal gains preference subsidizes the inefficient retention of corpo-
rate earnings-the larger the preference for capital gains, the
larger the subsidy.
The fact that noncorporate stockholders will benefit from an
inefficient management's retention of earnings with a capital gain
preference may reinforce the reluctance of noncorporate stock-
holders to incur significant costs in monitoring management's
investment of retained earnings. An attempt to control manage-
ment would force stockholders to incur costs, such as the costs of
a proxy battle, in what would likely be a losing effort. Given the
findings of some commentators that the aggravation people experi-
ence in losing money seems greater than the pleasure they experi-
ence in gaining the same amount, 176 the stockholders may well
decide to settle for "half a loaf" rather than risk the costs of a
proxy dispute with management. Indeed, the rate preference for
capital gains creates the potential for management to in effect
"punish" troublesome stockholders by increasing dividends and
thereby reducing the stockholders after-tax return. 177
Mutual funds, as well as individual stockholders, would be
reluctant to incur costs in controlling management of corporations
in which they hold stock because sixty-six percent of all mutual
176 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prosped Theory: An Analysis Of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979).
177 This would be particularly true if the corporation had attracted a clientele of
stockholders particularly averse to dividends. Some studies suggest that corporations may
attract a clientele of investors whose tax preferences match the corporation's dividend
policies (i.e. tax exempt stockholders would purchase dividend-paying stock while taxable
stockholders would prefer stock not paying dividends). See, eg., Costas P. Kaplanis, Op-
tions, Taxes and Ex-Dividend Day Behavior, 41 J. FIN. 411 (1986). However, the evidence
regarding the existence of clienteles for corporations based on their dividend policies is
generally regarded as weak. See, e.g., Crockett & Friend, supra note 150, at 604; Poterba
& Summers, supra note 113, at 276.
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fund assets are held by individuals.178 Because mutual furids are
generally taxed as flow-through entities,179 their noncorporate
stockholders directly benefit from the capital gains subsidy. Conse-
quently, to the extent management of mutual funds is seeking to
maximize the investment return of mutual fund stockholders, 180
mutual funds would prefer that the corporations in which the
mutual funds hold stock retain earnings as long as the after-tax
economic return from retention of earnings exceeds the after-tax
return from immediate distribution of earnings.
The second way in which a capital gains preference may con-
tribute to stockholder abdication is the manner in which a capital
gains preference motivates stockholders to realize corporate prof-
its: The incentive created by the preference to sell stock rather
than receive dividends over a period of time is not conducive to
encouraging stockholders to view the relationship with the corpo-
ration as long-term. Rather, the buy-sell investment strategy may
reinforce the view that stock is merely another commodity to be
traded, rather than part ownership of a business whose activity
should be monitored.' 8 ' Without the preferential tax rate for
long-term capital gains, stockholders would not be as motivated to
realize gains in lieu of receiving dividends and, as a result, would
perhaps be more likely to take an active interest in the
corporation's retention of earnings and the investment of those
earnings. It is interesting to observe that the number of sharehold-
er resolutions made annually by institutional investors tripled in
the four years after the repeal of the capital gains preference in
1986.182 It will be interesting to see whether the reintroduction
in 1991 of the small preference for capital gains (28 percent for
capital gains versus '31 percent for ordinary income) will reduce
the number of stockholder resolutions in the future.
178 INvESTMNT COMPANY INSTITrUTE, 1991 MUTUAL FUND FAcT BOOK 53 (1991).
179 See supra note 156.
180 Management of mutual funds, like management of corporations, may not always
be responsive to stockholders. &e Rock, supra note 87, at 469-78. However, mutual fund
management will generally welcome any opportunity to reduce costs; Id. at 474, and,
therefore, would welcome an excuse to avoid battling with corporate management about
dividend payments.
It should be noted that some mutual funds have as their stated objectives invest-
ment in dividend-paying stocks. Those mutual funds would not invest in corporations that
retain earnings regardless of the capital gains preference because of their stated invest-
ment objectives.
181 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
182 &e Brett D. Fromson, The Big Owners Roar, FORTUNE, July 30, 1990, at 66, 67.
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It is important to note that the existence of the tax bias cre-
ated by the capital gains preference in favor of the retention of
earnings is based on an important assumption. The assumption is
that stockholders can realize the value of the retained earnings at
a preferential tax rate when they sell their stock. In other words,
the above analysis assumes that the market places a higher value
on the stock of corporations that do not pay dividends compared
to identical corporations which do pay dividends. The higher value
is based on the expectation that distributions from the retaining
corporation will ultimately be received in situations eligible for the
favorable capital gains tax rate. Studies support this assumption,
although the evidence is not conclusive. 8 3
183 There are two competing schools of thought about the manner in which taxes on
corporate distributions affect stock prices. One theory (the tax-irrelevance theory) postu-
lates that prices are determined by marginal investors who face equal tax burdens on div-
idends and capital gains. See Miller & Scholes, supra note 147, at 333. Under this theory,
therefore, stocks which pay dividends should not sell at lower prices than identical stocks
which do not pay dividends since the marginal investors should not require higher pretax
returns to induce them to purchase stocks which pay dividends. James M. Poterba, Tax
Policy and Corporate Savings, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcrrtvTy 455, 466 (1987). The
second school of thought theorizes that shares which pay dividends sell at lower prices
because the marginal investor faces a higher tax on dividends than on capital gains. Id.
The majority of studies suggest that stocks of corporations which retain earnings sell
at prices higher than the stock of identical corporations which regularly distribute earn-
ings. See, eg., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 113, at 370-73 (summarizing the studies);
Roger H. Gordon & David F. Bradford, Taxation and the Stock Market Valuation Of Capital
Gains And Dividends, 14 J. PUB. ECON. 109 (1980); Robert H. Litzenberger & Krishna
Ramaswamy, The Effects of Dividends On Common Stock Prices: Tax Effects Or Information Ef-
fects, 37 J. FIN. 429 (1982); I.G. Morgan, Dividends and Capital Asset Prices, 37 J. FIN. 1071
(1982); Lambert Vanthienen & Theo Vermaelen, The Effect of Personal Taxes On Common
Stock Prices, 11 J. BANKING & FN. 223, 243 (1987). However, the studies are somewhat
controversial because of the difficulties of screening out the other factors which could
also have affected stock prices. See Nai-Fu Chen et al., Changing Risk, Changing Risk Premi-
ums, and Dividend Yield Effects, 63 J. Bus. S51, 568 (1990); Merton H. Miller, Behavioral
Rationality In Finance: The Case Of Dividends, 59 J. BUS. S451, S460-62 (1986).
Another related line of inquiry to determine whether marginal investors are in fact
taxed at a higher rate on dividends than on capital gains has been to examine price
changes around ex-dividend days for stock. If dividends are taxed at higher rates to mar-
ginal investors, those investors will demand a higher pretax premium from dividend in-
come than from capital gains in establishing the price at which the stock trades.
Theoharry Graramatikos, Dividend Strippin& Risk Exposure, and the Effect of the 1984 Tax
Reform Act on the Ex-Dividend Day Behavior, 62 J. Bus. 157, 159 (1989). They can obtain
this premium if stock prices decrease on ex-dividend days by less than the amount of the
dividend. Id. Several studies indicate that stock prices fall by less than the pretax amount
of the dividend, indicating that the marginal investors who establish the trading price
treat dividends as less valuable than capital gains. See, e.g., Michael J. Barclay, Dividends,
Taxes, and Common Stock Prices: The Ex-Dividend Day Behavior of Common Stock Prices before the
Income Tax, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 31, 39-40 (1987); Kenneth M. Eades et al., On Interpreting
Securities Returns During the Ex-Dividend Period, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 11 (1984); Edwin J.
[V7ol. 67:971
TAX POLICY AND STOCKHOLDER ABDICATION
D. The Questionable Benefit of
Holding Period Requirements
Even if one assumes that stockholders need encouragement to
permit management to adopt a long-term perspective, holding
period requirements for tax incentives have to be approached
cautiously. As discussed earlier, stockholders should already want
management to maximize long-term profits because it is in their
best economic interests."l s If stockholders are acting irrationally
in churning their portfolios and in demanding that management
maximize short-term profits, it is unlikely that they will respond
rationally to" tax incentives linked to holding period requirements.
On the other hand, if stockholders are acting rationally and want
management to maximize long-term profits but are trading stock
like commodities because their cost-benefit analyses suggest that it
is too expensive to influence management, holding period require-
ments for tax incentives might be utilized to alter their
cost-benefit analyses in a manner that maximizes social welfare.
However, policymakers have generally failed to analyze the effect
of holding period requirements on stockholders' cost-benefit anal-
yses or on social welfare. To analyze further the effect of holding
period requirements, it is useful to divide investors into two new
categories-taxable investors and tax-exempt investors.
1. Taxable Investors
The empirical studies clearly show that a holding period re-
quirement combined with a significant capital gains preference
induces taxable investors to hold appreciated securities for the
requisite holding period. In 1968, a report that examined the
effect of a six month holding period requirement for a capital
gains preference that taxed long-term gains at one-half the rate
applied to ordinary income found a significant impact on the
timing of gain realizations. 18 The report discovered that after
Elton et al., The Ex-Dividend Day Behavior of Stock Pices: A Re-Examination of the Clientele
Effect, 39 J. FiN. 551, 551-56 (1984); Poterba & Summers, supra note 113, at 252. Howev-
er, these findings are also controversial because they fail to show conclusively that the
ex-dividend day phenomenon is attributable to taxes and not other factors. See, e.g,
Giovanni Barone-Adesi & Robert E. Whaley, The Veuation of American Call Options and The
Expected Ex-Dividend Stock Price Decline, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 91, 110 (1986); Miller & Scholes,
supra note 147, at 1139-40.
184 See supra part IV.B.
185 J. Eric Fredland et al., The Six Month Holding Period For Capital Gains: An Empirical
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the acquisition of stock, sales were relatively high in the first
month of acquisition, but then steadily declined until the sixth
month of the holding period.' Realized gains then increased
markedly in the seventh month when they were eligible for
preferential treatment as long-term capital gain. 8 7 Similar results
were obtained in a 1981 study-i18
Although a holding period requirement for a large capital
gains preference encourages taxable investors to hold securities for
the requisite holding period, it is unlikely that the taxpayers'
"long-term" perspective will be any longer than the required hold-
ing period." 9 The studies show that after the holding period is
satisfied there is a strong incentive to sell because of the preferen-
tial tax rate applied to gains."9 This is not surprising because, as
discussed earlier,laa significant capital gains preference generally
encourages taxpayers to prefer capital gain over dividend in-
come.'92 The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has not-
ed that the average holding period for stock may decrease after
the adoption of a significant capital gains preference because the
preference increases the incentive to sell at the end of the hold-
ing period.'93 If the average holding period in fact decreases in
Analysis of Its Effect on the Timing of Gains, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 467, 468-70 (1968).
186 Id. Sales increased slightly in the sixth month apparently because some taxpayers
mistakenly calculated their holding period.
187 Id.
188 STEVEN KAPLAN, THE HOLDING PERIOD DIs'iNCTION OF THE CAPITAL GAINs TAX
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 762, 1981).
189 For a survey of the literature and a discussion of the complexities pertaining to
the relationship between a tax on capital gains and the effect of such a tax on stock-
holders holding periods, see Eric W. Cook & John F. O'Hare, Issues Relating To The Taxa-
tion Of Capital Gains, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 473, 477-78 (1987).
190 See, g., Frediand et al., supra note 186; Kiefer, supra note 119, at 82-83.
191 See supra part IV.C.1.
192 Indeed, Congress included the capital gains preference in the Revenue Act of
1921 because it believed that fully taxing gain on the sale of appreciated capital assets
deterred sales. See H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 11 (1921), reprinted in
1939-1(2) C.B. 168, 176. The reduction in the tax on capital gains would encourage
more sales and result in more tax revenues. Id.
193 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 101sr CONG., 1sT SEss., TAX TREATMENT
OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LossEs 22 (Comm. Print 1989). The Staff noted: "If a reduction
in the tax rate on capital gains induces taxpayers to realize gains in their portfolios more
frequently and to realize gains which they otherwise would have held ... until death,
then taxpayers' average holding periods for all assets in their portfolios may decline." But
see Kiefer, supra note 119, at 88-90 (concluding that under the author's model for stock
trading, a reduction of the maximum tax rate on capital gains to 15% for qualifying
assets, held for one year, and then increasing the requisite holding period to two years
on January 1, 1993, and to three years on January 1, 1995, would increase the average
holding period while at the same time encouraging increased realizations of capital
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response to the enactment of a capital gains preference, then
management's planning horizon will become shorter rather than
longer.
If policymakers wish to maximize the period which manage-
ment will have to achieve its long-term objective, it will be nec-
essary to impose a longer holding period than has been used in
recent years. In most instances, holding period requirements of
one year or less will not achieve the stated goal of permitting
management to adopt a long-term perspective because perfecting
new production methods or developing new products usually takes
significantly longer than one year." However, lengthening the
holding period poses additional problems. Since investors also
desire potential liquidity during the period of their investment
(the liquidity preference theory), they will expect to be compen-
sated for reducing their liquidity in order to satisfy the holding
period requirement.'95 Thus, the longer the holding period re-
quirement is, the greater the tax benefit will have to be in order
to induce investors to hold their securities. This is not a new con-
cept. For example, the Revenue Act of 1934 employed a graduated
scale for taxing capital gains depending on the length of the hold-
ing period.'96 The amount of capital gains included in ordinary
income ranged from 80 percent for assets held longer than one
year down to only 30 percent for assets held for over 10 years.
Similarly, several bills introduced in Congress in recent years uti-
lize a graduated scale.'97
The problem with providing a larger tax benefit for longer
holding periods is that it is extremely difficult to relate the size of
gains).
194 See generally Jeff Moad, Natigating Cross-Funclional IS Waters, DATAMATION, March 1,
1989, at 73, 75 (After implementing computer aided design and manufacturing systems,
Xerox has been able to cut its product development cycle from 5 years to 2 1/2 years.);
Daniel Valentino & Bill Christ, Teaming Up For Market: Cheaper, Better, Faster, MGMT. REV.,
Nov. 1989, at 46, 46-49 (RCA has been able to reduce its product development cycle
from 4 years to 2.5 years.).
195 See, eg., EDWIN J. ELTON & MARTIN J. GRUBER, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND
INvWSrMENT ANAL 'Ss 462-64 (3d ed. 1987); Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset
Priing and the Bid-Ask Spread 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 224 (1986). For an excellent discus-
sion of the literature documenting the value of liquidity, see Rebecca S. Rudnick, Wo
Should Pay the Corporate Tax In a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1103-27
(1988-89).
196 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 117, 48 Stat. 680, 714 (1934) (current version in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
197 S eg., H.R. 3652, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3972, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990); S. 2071, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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the tax preference to its revenue impact and the intended welfare
benefits which may arise from investors holding their securities for
a longer time. The required holding period for stock should ide-
ally vary with the time horizon necessary to complete each
corporation's particular project. However, this would be difficult to
administer because the time required to complete the projects will
vary significantly depending upon the industry and nature of the
project.198 These administrative problems necessitate the use of
fixed holding periods with corresponding preferential tax rates
which apply to all stocks regardless of the individual planning
horizons of the different issuers. The result is that any ex ante at-
tempt to correlate the size of the preference with the social bene-
fit of lengthening the period for which an investor is willing to
hold stock is largely an arbitrary process. It is noteworthy that
since 1921, the holding periods for the capital gains preference
have varied from six months to ten years."9
The other problem with providing a larger tax benefit for
longer holding periods is that there is no guarantee that longer
holding periods encourage stockholders to incur additional costs
to monitor management and, therefore, provide any social benefit.
As discussed earlier,2 ° the larger the preferential tax treatment
for capital gains, the greater the subsidy for the inefficient reten-
tion of earnings. Thus, the larger the preference, the less likely
that stockholders will devote resources to monitoring manage-
ment.2 11 Without additional activism by stockholders, it is likely
that management will seek to achieve its own objectives (including
the maximization of short-term profits) 202 regardless of the hold-
ing period requirement.
2. Tax-Exempt Investors
Tax-exempt investors, such as pension funds and university
endowments, comprise a large percentage of investors in the secu-
198 See generally Clint Larson, Team Tactics Can Cut Product Development Costs, J. Bus.
STRAThGY, Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 22; Yutaka Kuwahara et al., Planning Research and Development
at Hitach4 22 LONG RANGE PLANNING, June 1989, at 54, 55; John Teresko, Speeding the
Product Development Cycle; INDUS. WK., July 18, 1988, at 40, 40-42; Valentino & Christ, supra
note 195, at 46.
199 See James R. Repetti, The Use of Tax Law to Stabilize the Stock Market: The Efficaiy of
Holding Period Requirements, 8 VA. TAX REV. 591, 596-601 (1989).
200 See supra text accompanying notes 174-184.
201 Id.
202 See supra text accompanying notes 137-173.
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rides market. These investors cannot be influenced by the capital
gains preference since they are usually not subject to any tax.
Consequently, it has been suggested that a transfer tax be imposed
on the gains of these institutions (as well as taxable investors)
which arise from the sale or exchange of securities held for less
than a specified period.' 3
The imposition of a tax on the short-term gains of taxable
investors and otherwise tax-exempt investors should encourage
investors to hold stock for the requisite holding period.2 How-
ever, this does not necessarily mean that a stock transfer tax would
encourage the investors to incur additional costs in monitoring
management. As discussed earlier," 5 the transaction costs of
stockholder activism are high, and the "free-rider" and legal prob-
lems associated with stockholder activism would still exist.2" A
large securities transfer tax that reduces the benefit of a sale
might cause the incurrance of expenses to control management to
appear relatively more attractive to an investor than selling the
corporation's stock, but would not solve the "free-rider" problem
and the other legal impediments to stockholder activism. Thus,
the social benefit of a transfer tax is unclear. Moreover, in identi-
fying the social benefit, the cost arising from the possibility that a
large securities transfer tax could significantly impair market effi-
ciency has to be considered.
20 7
3. Efficiency Distortions of Holding Period Requirements
The imposition of holding period requirements as a prerequi-
site for favorable tax treatment could impair market efficiency by
distorting securities prices. In a rationally efficient stock market,
prices are determined in a manner which equates the marginal
rates of return (adjusted for risk) of all producers and savers.208
Scarce resources, therefore, are optimally allocated among produc-
203 S. 1654, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
204 S&e supra text accompanying notes 185-188 for a discussion of the impact of a
holding period requirement for capital gains preferences.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 67-78.
206 See Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, The Case for a Securities Transac-
tios Excise Tax, 48 TAX NOTES 879, 882 (1990) (noting that stock transfer tax would
probably not encourage stockholder activism because of "free-rider" problem).
207 Kiefer, supra note 111, at 889; Repetti, stpra note 41, at 88.
208 See WILuAM J. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY vii (1965);
COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 113, at 330.
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tive investments.2" Holding period requirements would distort
this allocation process by affecting the prices of securities and, as
a result, the rates of return of the securities. This distortion would
occur because investors would be induced to hold a security when
real economic factors, such as an increase in the amount of risk
associated with the return of the security, might dictate that the
investor sell.21 The inducement to hold the security would cause
the security price to be above the price which would be estab-
lished in a nondistorted market by artificially decreasing the sup-
ply of securities.2" Of course, once the holding period is satis-
fied, a taxpayer may be particularly eager to sell risky securities in
order to lock in the gain.212
It is possible that this distortion would not be great because
at any given time, although some investors would be holding secu-
rities to satisfy the requirement, the majority of investors would
have satisfied the holding period requirement. However, evidence
suggests that at times investors will act in tandem as they are at-
tracted to a rising market.1" Explanations of this phenomenon
have been based on both rational stockholder behavior in the case
of rational speculative bubbles,214 and irrational stockholder be-
havior in the case of "fads".215 Under either explanation, inves-
209 COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 112.
210 KAPLAN, supra note 188.
211 Because stocks have a downward sloping demand curve, stock prices respond to
changes in supply. Andrei Schleifer, Do Demand Curves For Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN.
579, 588-89 (1986).
212 See George M. Constantinides, Optimal Stock Trading with Personal Taxes: Implications
for Prices and the Abnormal January Returns, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 65, 73 (1984).
213 KENNETH A. FROOT ET AL, HERD ON THE STREET: INFORMATIONAL INEFFICIENCIES
IN A MARKET WITH SHORT-TERM SPECULATION (National Bureau of Economics Research
Working Paper No. 3250, 1990); Gikas A. Hardouvelis, Evidence on Stock Market Speculative
Bubbles: Japan, the United States, and Great Britain, 13 FEDERAL RES. BANK N.Y. Q. REV.,
Summer 1988, at 4, 8-15; Robert J. Shiller, Fashion, Fads, and Bubbles in Financial Markets,
in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS supra note 25, at 56, 59.
214 See, eg., Costas Azariadis, Self Fulfilling Prophesies, 25 J. ECON. THEORY 380, 380-81,
395 (1981); Oliver J. Blanchard & Mark W. Watson, Bubbles, Rational Expedations, and
Financial Markets, in CRISES IN THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 295, 295-99
(Paul Wachtel ed., 1982); Richard A. Meese, Testing for Bubbles in Exchange Markets: A Case
of Sparkling Rates, 94 J. POL. ECON. 345, 346 (1986); see also Jean Tirole, On the Possibility
of Speculation Under Rational Expedations, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1163, 1178-97 (1982) (formu-
lating a model using the rational expectations theory which allows for the formation of
speculative bubbles); F. van der Ploeg, Rational Expectations, Risk, and Chaos in Financial
Markets, 96 ECON. J. 151, 151-52 (Supp. 1986) (hypothesizing that rational speculative
bubbles occur in the bond market). For an interesting account of many historical bub-
bles, see CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES (1978).
215 KEYNES, supra note 76, at 56, 59; Shiller, supra note 213, at 59.
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tors contemporaneously buying into a rising market could result in
a significant portion of investors being subject to holding period
requirements at the same time. 6 The tax incentive to hold rath-
er than sell could fuel the increase in stock prices above the value
which would otherwise have been established in an efficient mar-
ket by artificially restricting the supply of securities, 217 resulting
in prices no longer appropriately reflecting their rates of return as
adjusted for risk. Moreover, the artificial inflation of prices caused
by holding period requirements could in certain scenarios con-
tribute to stock market volatility by exacerbating the amount by
which prices have to fall in order to reach their fundamental
value when the bubble bursts or the fad dissipates after the hold-
ing period has been satisfied.1
V. USING THE TAX SISTEM TO
INFLUENCE MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR
A. Incentives to Motivate Behavior-
Management Stock Ownership Incentives
In addition to the questionable impact of holding periods and
the capital gains preference on stockholder behavior, Congress has
also adopted various tax provisions with the intention of influenc-
ing management behavior. As is the case with capital gains, .the
analyses of the provisions have failed to focus sufficiently on the
effect of the separation of ownership from control. In particular,
Congress has repeatedly failed to consider fully the fact that stock-
holder abdication generally enables management to avoid modify-
ing its behavior in response to the tax incentives Congress has
created while; at the same time, benefitting from the incentives.
This Section focuses on a provision which Congress has adopt-
ed with the hope of more closely aligning management objectives
with stockholder objectives-incentive stock option plans.
1. History of Incentive Stock Options
In general, under I.R.C. §83, the receipt of a stock option as
part of an executive compensation package is not a taxable
216 Repetti, supra note 199, at 616-17.
217 Since stocks have a downward sloping demand curve, an increase in demand with-
out an accompanying increase in price will raise stock prices. Shleifer, supra note 211, at
588-89.
218 &e Repetti, supra note 199, at 617.
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event. 19 Rather, the option holder recognizes income at the
time the option is exercised. The income equals the amount by
which the fair market value of the stock received upon exercise
exceeds the price paid for the stock pursuant to the option.2 °
Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1950,"1 however, Con-
gress has provided certain preferential tax treatment for stock op-
tions granted to key employees. In the Revenue Act of 1950, Con-
gress adopted §130A, later recodified as §420 in the Revenue Act
of 1956, which, if certain conditions were satisfied, permitted the
holder of a qualified option to defer the recognition of gain at
the time the option was exercised. Gain would only be recognized
upon the subsequent sale of the stock to the extent the sale price
exceeded the amount paid for the stock upon exercise of the
option.
Congress adopted the preferential treatment for stock options
to encourage their use as management incentives. The assumption
was that incentives which provided management with a stock inter-
est in the corporation would be advantageous to the economy by
more closely aligning management's interests with the
stockholders' interest.12 The early legislative history of stock op-
tions, however, indicates that Congress failed to consider fully the
extent to which management's control of public corporations rela-
tively unfettered by stockholders meant that management could
obtain the benefits of the preferential tax treatment for options
without modifying its behavior.
The original version of stock options adopted in 1950, re-
ferred to as "restricted stock options," reflected some legislative
awareness that executives would use their power to obtain the
favorable tax treatment provided by restricted stock options with-
out aligning their objectives more closely with stockholders. Thus,
219 Treas Reg. § 1.83-7 (1978). Receipt of a stock option is not a taxable event un-
less the option is actively traded on an established market or meets the following condi-
tions: (I) the option is transferable (2) the option is exercisable in full (3) the opfion
or the stock receivable upon exercise is not subject to any restriction or condition which
has a significant effect on fair market value and (4) the value can be measured with
reasonable accuracy. Id. § 1.83-7(b).
220 Id. § 1.83-7(a).
221 Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 218(a), 64 Stat. 906, 942 (repealed 1976)
(current version at I.R.C. § 422 (West Supp. 1992)).
222 S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.CA.N.
3053, 3194-15; H. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313, 1372; S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), sprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1673, 1761.
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the statute required that stock acquired pursuant to the exercise
of a "restricted stock option" not be sold less than two years subse-
quent to the date on which the option was granted, and that such
stock also be 'held for at least six months after -the exercise of the
option." Congress stated that the purpose for this requirement
was to insure that the employee "remains in the employment of
the company for a substantial period after the time when he ac-
quires the option and actually invests in the stock of the company
for a considerable period."
224
In addition, "restricted stock options" could not be granted to
any employee owning directly or indirectly more than 10 percent
of the combined voting power of all classes of stock of the em-
ployer corporation.225 The legislature imposed this requirement
to "prevent the use of stock options by employers who seek merely
to convert the earning of a corporation from ordinary income into
a capital gain. " " However, the provision also had the perhaps
unintended beneficial result of confining the tax advantage to
those employees whose alignment with stockholders would provide
the greatest benefit to the corporation. Granting stock to employ-
ees who already own 10 percent of the stock of the corporation is
unlikely to have provided significant benefits to the corpora-
* 227tion.
Despite legislative concern that management objectives should
be more closely aligned with stockholder objectives, Congress
failed to anticipate the ingenuity of management in obtaining the
benefits of restricted stock options without actually adopting stock-
223 § 218(a). See generally John H. Alexander, Employee Stock Options And The 1950
Revenue Act, 6 TAX L REV. 165 (1950) (providing a detailed description of the features
of restricted stock options); Jack D. Edwards, Executive Compensation: The Taxation of Stock
Options, 13 VAND. L. REV. 475 (1960) (same).
224 S. REP. No. 2375, supra note 222, at 3115.
225 Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 218(a), 64 Stat. 906, 942 (repealed 1976).
226 S. REP. No. 2375, supra note 222, at 3115.
227 See Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical
Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 294-95 (1988); which found that firm performance for
corporations improved when the percentage of ownership in the corporation by directors
increased from 0 to 5 percent, but then began to fall as ownership increased beyond
5%. See generally, Michael C. Jensen & Jerold B. Warner, The Distribution of Power Among
Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 12-15 (1988) (surveying
the literature regarding the impact of executive stock ownership on corporate perfor-
mance.) But see John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence On Equity Owner-
ship And Corporate Value 27 J. FIN. ECON. 595, 603-09 (1990) (finding corporate perfor-
mance increased as management's percentage of stock ownership increased from 0% to
approximately 40% and then began to decline).
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holder objectives. Thus, the 1964 Revenue Act replaced restricted
stock options with a new form of option, the "qualified stock op-
tion," " which would qualify for the same favorable tax benefit
as restricted stock options if certain new requirements intended to
correct management abuses were satisfied.2 One of Congress'
concerns was that executives were disposing of their stock shortly
after satisfying the six month holding period and, as a result, not
maintaining a significant stake in the employer corporation.2W In
response, the 1964 Act increased the period for which an employ-
ee was required to hold stock after the exercise of an option from
six months to three years.21  Critics of restricted stock options
had also charged that executives could obtain substantial benefits
from an option even if the market price of the corporation's stock
fell by obtaining a new option with a lower exercise price.2 2
The legislative response to prevent this required that a qualified
stock option not be exercisable until previously granted options
had been fully exercised or the period for their exercise had ex-
pired.53
Lastly, Congress was concerned that executives were granting
themselves options without stockholder- approval.' Thus, the
legislature imposed a requirement that stockholders approve the
plan pursuant to which the options were granted. The stock op-
tion plan would have to specify the number of shares of stock to
be issued pursuant to the exercise of options and the employees
or class of employees to receive options. 2 5
228 Revenue Act of 1964, P.L No. 88-272, § 422(a), 78 Stat 19, 64 (1934) (repealed
1976).
229 H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1964), epfrinted in 1964 U.S.C.CAN.
13722; S. REP. No. 830, supra note 222; see also Edwin H. Baker, Employee Stock Option
Plans Under The Revenue Act of 1964, 20 TAX L. REV. 77, 77-79 (1964-65).
230 Id. See also President's Message to the Congress on Tax Reduction and Reform,
1963 PUB. PAPERS 73 (Jan. 24, 1963) [hereinafter President's Message]; Revenue Act of
1964, P.L. No. 88-272, § 422(a), 78 Stat. 19, 64 (repealed 1976).
231 Revenue Act of 1964, P.L No. 88-272, § 422(a), 78 Stat. 19, 64 (repealed 1976).
232 President's Message, supra note 230, at 484; Erwin N. Griswold, The Mysterim Stock
ption,' Committee on Ways and Means, Tax Revision Compendium, part 2, 1328 (1959);
S. REP. No. 830, supra note 222, at 1762.
233 I.R.C. §§ 422(b)(5), 422(c)(2) (West Supp.'1992). See also, S. REP. No. 830, supra
note 229, at 1762.
234 S. REP. No. 830, supra note 222, at 1763.
235 I.R.C. § 422(b)(1) (West Supp. 1992). Congress also added the requirement that
the exercise price at the time the option is granted be equal to the fair market value of
the stock. Prior to the 1964 Act, the exercise price for the option only had to equal
85% of the fair market value of the stock at the time the option was granted. Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, P.L. No. 591, § 421, 68A Stat. 3, 142 (repealed 1964). Congress
[Vol. 67:971
TAX POLICY AND STOCKHOLDER ABDICATION
In 1976, Congress repealed the preferential tax treatment for
stock options.' A depressed stock market had caused it to reex-
amine the value of stock options as an incentive. 7 The legisla-
ture determined that since the value of compensation in the form
of stock options was subject to the uncertainties of the stock mar-
ket, it seemed "doubtful" that a qualified option provided an in-
centive greater than other forms of compensation.' Moreover,
it felt that even if qualified stock options were an effective incen-
tive, the options nevertheless constituted compensation and should
be taxed as such.239
However, Congress again reversed course in 1981 and adopted
the present "incentive stock option" rules, 240 apparently hoping
that reinstituting tax incentives for stock options would encourage
management to improve the operations and profitability of their
firms.241 At the same time, provisions were included to thwart
executive abuses that arose under prior law. 242 To insure that ex-
increased the required exercise price in order "to decrease the compensatory returns of
the existing stock option provision and to place greater emphasis on the employee's
efforts to improve his company business and thereby raise the price level of the stock."
S. REP. No. 830, supra note 222, at 1762.
236 Tax Reform Act of 1976, P.L. No. 94-455, §§ 603(a),(b), 1906(b)(13)(A), 90 Stat.
1520, 1574, 1834.
237 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAx'N, 94TH CONG., IST SESS.,
RETIREMENT INCOME CREDIT, CHILD CARE DEDUCTION, QUALIFIED STOCK OPTIONS, AND
SICK PAY EXCLUSION 10-11 (Comm. Print 1975), which stated in part-
Qualified stock options have become less attractive as a compensation technique
in recent years because of the generally declining stock market in recent years.
The market price of stocks of many publicly held companies has dropped sub-
stantially in the recent recession. As a result, many qualified stock options
granted in previous years at purchase prices which seemed attractive on an as-
sumption that the price of the company's stock would rise became unattractive
as the price of the outstanding stock fell. Many executives thus had no incentive
to exercise their options which were "under water", i.e. options whose exercise
price was higher than the current level of the company's stock in the open
market. Because of this loss-of-incentive feature (and the prohibition against
resulting the option price downward), many companies have turned to other
techniques and plans as a way to compensate their executives.
238 S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Yejinted in 1976-3 C.B. 49, 199.
239 Id.
240 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, P.L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 256 (1981)
(current version at I.R.C. § 422 (West Supp. 1992)).
241 S. REP. NO. 144, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1981).
242 Id. See ahso STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., IST SESS.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 159, (Comm. Print
1981).
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ecutives would have a commitment to the corporation's long-term
success, the incentive stock option rules require the employee to
hold the stock during a two year period from the date the option
was granted and for one year after the stock was received.24 In
addition, the option holder is required to be an employee of the
corporation granting the option' for the entire period from
the date of granting the option 245 up to three months prior tothe date of exercise of the option.
2. Analysis of Incentive Stock Option s
Whether increased stock ownership by management through
stock options will reconcile the clashing objectives of management
and stockholders is unresolved. 46 One study that illustrates the
ambiguous benefit of increased stock ownership for management
and directors found that corporate performance improved when
directors' ownership increased from 0 to 5 percent, but then de-
creased as the directors' ownership exceeded 5 percent.247 The
study demonstrates the complex relationship between compensa-
tion packages and management motivation. The study's findings
could be interpreted as indicating that at a sufficiently high level
of stock ownership, management will use its power to expropriate
immediately for its benefit the resources of the firm rather than
wait for some future payout that might accompany the sale of
their stock. As long as management owns less than 100 percent of
the corporation, it will normally benefit more from expropriating
wealth than from stock ownership. Thus, the theoretical grounding
of stock options in resolving the agency conflict between manage-
ment and outside investors is not clear.
Even given the questionable premise on which tax preferences
for stock options are based, the incentive stock option provisions
are no better at accomplishing their legislative purpose of encour-
243 I.RIC. § 422(a) (1) (West Supp. 1992).
244 I.RC. § 422(a)(2) requires that the option recipient be an "employee of either
the corporation granting such option, a parent or subsidiary corporation of such corpo-
ration, or a corporation or a parent or subsidiary corporation of such corporation ....
Id. § 422(a)(2).
245 I& Incentive stocks options, as was the case with qualified stock options, must also
be granted pursuant to a plan approved by stockholders.
246 See Jensen & Warner, supra note 227, at 12-15 (surveying the literature regarding
the impact of executive stock ownership on corporate performance).
247 Morck et al., supra note 227, at 294-95. Cf McConnell & Servaes, supra note 227,
at 603-09 (finding corporate performance increased as management's percentage of stock
ownership increased from 0% to approximately 40% and then began to decline).
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aging long-term investment by management than the rules which
apply to restricted stock options and qualified stock options. Con-
gress has failed to consider fully the interaction of the incentive
stock option rules* with the current tax treatment for options not
qualifying as incentive stock options ("nonqualified options") un-
der I.R.C. section 83.24" The fact that the maximum corporate
income tax rate is now higher than the maximum individual rate
causes nonqualified options to be more attractive for compensat-
ing management than incentive stock options, with the result that
incentive stock options are rarely utilized.249 To understand why
incentive stock options are rarely used, consider the following
example.20
Suppose that X Corp. is contemplating issuing an option to
an employee with an exercise price of $100 for one share of stock.
First, consider the tax treatment if the option is nonqualified. The
employee's receipt of the option is not taxable as long as the
option does not have a "readily ascertainable fair market value" as
described in Treasury Regulation § 1.83-7.251 If the stock value
increases to $200 and the employee exercises the option, the em-
ployee will have $100 of ordinary income,5 2 and the corporation
that granted the option will have a deduction of $100. ~ Assum-
ing that the employee immediately sells the stock and pays tax at
a 31 percent marginal rate and the corporation. pays tax at a 34
percent marginal rate, the employee will have a net after tax re-
turn of $69 and the corporation will have obtained the benefit of
a $100 deduction from income which increased its after-tax cash
flow by $34.
Next, consider the tax treatment if the option is an incentive
stock option. Again, receipt 6f the option is not a taxable event so
long as Treasury Regulation § 1.83-7 is satisfied. When the incen-
tive stock option is exercised, the corporation will not have a de-
248 See supra text accompanying notes 222-228.
249 See Mayer Siegal et al., Executive Compensation: Stock and Phantoms, in 47 NEW YORK
UNIVERSrTY INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAxATION § 6.02, at 6-5 to 6-6 (Annual Conference on
Employee Benefits and Executive Compensation 1989).
250 This example is based on an example from BrrrKER &. LOKKEN, supra note 4,
S60.6.1.
251 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
252 I.R.C. § 83(a) (West Supp. 1992).
253 The corporation's deduction of the $100 depends, of course, upon satisfying the
requirements of § 162. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a)(1). Thus the expense must be an "ordi-
nary and necessary" business expense which constitutes reasonable compensation and
which is not a capital expenditure. BrrrEER & LOKKEN, supra note 4, 60.4.5.
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duction 254 and, the employee will not recognize income.2 5 5 As-
suming that the employee satisfies the requisite holding periods
and then sells the stock for $200, the employee would have a
capital gain of $100. After paying a tax of 28 percent for the capi-
tal gain, the employee would have $72.
From the employer's perspective, nonqualified options are
preferable because the employer gets a $100 deduction when the
option is exercised. In contrast, the employee may at first glance
seem to prefer incentive stock options because no gain is recog-
nized upon the exercise of the option but instead is deferred until
the stock is ultimately sold, and because of the preferential capital
gain treatment. However, the incentive stock option has significant
disadvantages."5 6 In order to obtain the preferential treatment,
the executive must hold the stock for the required' one year hold-
ing period. All other factors being equal, stockholders generally
prefer liquidity, i.e., the ability to convert stock to cash whenever
they wish.15 7 Moreover, executives generally prefer as much com-
pensation as quickly as possible, rather than deferred compensa-
tion, because they prefer to maximize the present value of their
return on the investment of their human capital."5 Additionally,
incentive stock option plans have to be approved by stockhold-
ers, 59 while no such requirement exists for nonqualified op-
260tions.
"Fortunately" for management, there is a tax "excuse" that
justifies using nonqualified options and that leaves both the cor-
poration and employee better off. Recall that with respect to the
incentive stock option the executive had $72 after holding the
stock for one year and. paying tax on the gain, and the corpora-
tion had no deduction. With respect to the nonqualified option,
254 I.R.C. §§ 421(a)(2), 422(a) (West Supp. 1992).
255 Id.
256 See BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 4, at 60.6.
257 See supra text accompanying note 195.
258 See generally Fama & Jensen, supra note 6, at 303. The executive might prefer to
hold the stock, however, if he or she is advanced in age and wishes to take advantage of
the step-up in basis at death under § 1014(a). The step-up in basis would enable his or
her estate to avoid paying income tax on the difference between the amount paid for
the stock and the fair market value of the stock at the time of death. See BrrrKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 4 1 60.6.1.
259 I.R.C. § 422(b)(1) (West Supp. 1992).
260 An additional benefit to management which arises from stock options (both in-
centive and nonqualified) is that the corporation is not required to report an expense
on its income statement when an option is granted and when the option is exercised.
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25 (Oct. 1972).
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the executive had $69 after tax and the corporation had a $100
deduction. The $100 deduction increased the corporation's cash
flow by $34 since the $100 deduction was not attributable to a
cash payment to the employee, but instead the issuance of
stock. 21 . The corporation can give the executive the economic
benefit of the incentive stock option by giving him or her the
nonqualified option and paying him or her $4.35 cash upon exer-
cise of the nonqualified option. 62 Upon exercise of the option,
the executive will recognize $100 of ordinary income from the
exercise and $4.35 of ordinary income from the cash payment. If
the executive immediately sells the stock received upon exercise of
the option, he or she will have $72 after paying tax on the recog-
nized income, the same amount the executive would have with the
incentive stock option. Moreover, the corporation gets a deduction
of $100 for the transfer of stock and a deduction of $4.35 for the
payment of cash. The net affect on the corporation's cash flow of
deducting $104.35 and paying $4.35 cash to the employee is that
it increases its net cash flow by $31.13.2
A corporation is most likely to prefer incentive stock options
over nonqualified options when it does not need additional deduc-
tions, or when it cannot expend the cash to reimburse the em-
ployee for the tax liability arising from the exercise of a
nonqualified option. These situations are most likely to arise when
the corporation is in the start-up phase or when it is not profit-
able. 2  When a corporation is in the start-up phase, however,
tax incentives such as incentive stock options are not needed to
more closely align management with stockholders' because the
stockholders (frequently venture capital firms or members of the
management team of the company) are usually already carefully
monitoring the activities of management. Venture capitalists will
generally not invest in a corporation unless they are given tight
control over management. Similarly, if the corporation is not prof-
itable, it is unlikely that incentive stock options will be used. The
poor profitability would likely mean that stock prices are low and
261 The corporation's issuance of stock upon exercise of the nonqualified option was
not costless, however. It did dilute current stockholder ownership by a value of $100.
262 See BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 4, at 1 60.6.
263 This is calculated by subtracting the cash outlay of $4.35 from the income shel-
tered from the deduction ((.34 x 100) + (.34 x 4.35)).
264 See Alisa Baker, Incentive Stock Options Continue to Be a Viable Choice Despite TRA '86,
68J. TAX'N 164, 164 (1988) (stating benefits of incentive stock options for start-up com-
panies).
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there is no guarantee that the prices will rebound quickly. Man-
agement would prefer to use other mechanisms that provide great-
er assurance of compensation as quickly as possible. 5
The net result is that the attempt to use incentive stock op-
tions as a mechanism for aligning management objectives with
stockholder objectives is a failure.26 Management avoids using
them because the holding period defers compensation and re-
strains liquidity. Even if Congress reduced the holding period
requirement, it is unlikely that incentive stock options would be
utilized. Management would avoid them because they require
stockholder approval and because the corporation can obtain
more favorable tax treatment through the use of nonqualified
options.
B. Disincentives for Certain Management
Activities-Golden Parachute and
Greenmail Provisions
In addition to encouraging management activity to be more
consonant with stockholder objectives by providing incentives for
management to become stockholders, Congress has also promul-
gated Code provisions to discourage certain management activities.
In particular, Congress has adopted sections 280G and 4999 to
discourage the use of golden parachute contracts, which usually
pay management large sums in the event control of the corpo-
ration changes. Similarly, section 5881 was adopted in order to
discourage "greenmail" payments, which are generally payments
made by a corporation to repurchase stock at a premium from a
person who has made a tender offer or threatened a tender offer
for stock of the corporation.
Under section 280G, payments made to an officer, sharehold-
er, or "highly compensated"2 7 individual are generally not de-
ductible by the corporation if (1) the payments are contingent on
a change in ownership or effective control of the corporation or
in the ownership of a substantial portion of the corporation's
265 See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
266 For an interesting critique of other tax policy problems with incentive stock op-
tions, see Michael W. Melton, The Aldzemy of Incentive Stock Options-Turning Employee In-
come Into Gold, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 500-12 (1983).
267 The term "highly compensated" individual is defined in I.R.C. § 280G(c) as a
member of a group which consists of the highest paid one percent of the corporation's
employees or highest paid 250 employees, whichever group is smaller. I.R.C. § 280G(c)
(West Supp. 1992).
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assets, and (2) the present value of the payments are at least three
times the individual's average annual compensation from the com-
pany over the past five years.2 s If the payment is not deductible
by, the corporation, the recipient of the payment must pay an
excise tax equal to 20 percent of the amount of the payment
which the corporation can not deduct.269 The recipient may not
deduct the excise tax.2
Under section 5881, a nondeductible tax of 50 percent is
imposed on gain that a person realizes upon the receipt of a
"greenmail" payment.2 7 1 The term "greenmail payment" is de-
fined to include any payment made to a stockholder who has held
stock for less than two years and has threatened or actually made
a public tender offer for the company's stock, if the payment has
not also been offered to all other stockholders of the compa-
ny.2 72
Interestingly, the golden parachute provisions and greenmail
provisions were enacted by Congress for conflicting purposes.
Congress adopted the golden parachute provisions in 1984 in
order to discourage management from shielding itself from hostile
takeovers.2 73 Congress was concerned that the large payments
triggered by a takeover would discourage takeovers and thereby
enable management in effect to entrench itself.2 74 Congress also
wanted to insure that golden parachutes would not bias manage-
ment in favor of a hostile takeover that was not in the best inter-
est of stockholdersY5 Thus, Congress seemed interested in insur-
ing that the takeover market would operate efficiently without
managerial bias in order to enable the takeover market to police
corporate efficiency.2 7
6
However, three years later, Congress adopted the greenmail
provisions with the stated purpose of discouraging hostile
takeovers.2 77 Congress had apparently concluded by 1987 that
268 Id. § 280G(a).
269 LR.C. § 4999 (West 1988).
270 I.R.C. § 275(a)(6) (West Supp. 1992).
271 Id. § 5881 (a).
272 Id. § 5881(b).
273 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SESs., GENERAL Ex-
PLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFIcrr REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, AT 199
(Comm. Print 1984).
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 See id. at 199-200.
277 S&e H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1086 (1987).
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the beneficial role that a takeover played in policing efficiency was
outweighed by the social harm in terms of unemployment and
disruption.278 Although greenmail provisions also have the effect
of preventing management from entrenching itself by in effect
"buying off" the bidder, the committee reports did not express
that as another objective of the greenmail legislation.279
1. Problems with the Golden Parachute Rules
Greenmail and golden parachute provisions reflect an incom-
plete understanding of the separation of ownership from control
issues. 2" The golden parachute provisions that are aimed at pre-
venting management of the target corporation from polluting the
takeover process by exacting a large fee assumes a pristine
take-over market which is not affected by management of the
bidder companies seeking to achieve its own objectives. By ignoring
the fact that management of the bidding corporation may be
seeking to achieve its own objectives rather than impose efficiency
on the target, the rule seriously misjudges the utility of golden
parachute agreements.
Although, on average, corporations subject to hostile takeovers
are less efficient than other companies,21 not all takeover targets
are inefficiently managed.28 2 Management of bidding companies
may attempt acquisitions of very well managed companies in order
to achieve their own objectives.23 The objectives of the bidding
company's management might include increased job security or an
increase in the size of the company in order to justify increased
compensation. 214 In an analysis of 326 acquisitions involving pub-
278 See id.
279 Id.
280 The provisions have many other problems from a tax policy perspective which are
insightfully analyzed in Edward A. Zelinsky, Greenmai4 Golden Parachutes and the Internal
Revenue Code: A Tax Policy Citique of Section 2806, 4999 and 5881, 35 VILL L. REV. 131
(1990).
281 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Value Maximization and the Acquisition Proces,
2 J. ECON. PERSPECrIVES 7 (1988). The study found that the average Tobin's "q" for a
sample of 371 firms in the Fortune 500 was .848 while the average Tobin's "q" for firms
from that sample, which were subsequently subject to a hostile takeover, was only 0.524.
The "q" represents the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of
the firm's physical assets. Firms with a low "q", therefore, tend to be less efficient. Thus,
the study suggests that on average less efficient firms are subject to takeovers. Id.
282 Morck et al., sutra note 32, at 31-32.
283 Id.
284 Id. See also Richard Roll, The Hubres Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUs. 197
(1986).
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licly held companies, one study found that 25 percent of the ac-
quisitions not only had a negative economic impact on the
stockholders of the bidding company as exhibited by a decline in
the price of the bidding company's stock price, but that the com-
bined value of the target and bidder dropped.2"5 The study sug-
gests that at least 25 percent of acquisitions involving public com-
panies do not make any economic sense.
The problem with the golden parachute rules is that they fail
to recognize the fact that although golden parachutes may help
entrench -inefficient management, in certain instances they may
help protect efficient management from inefficient bidders. 286.
Congress seemed partially aware that golden parachute payments
might benefit stockholders because it exempted payments by
"small business corporations "287 and corporations whose stock is
not publicly traded and whose stockholders have approved the
golden parachute payment from the general rule that such pay-
ments are not deductible and are subject to an excise tax.2 8
However, by their very nature such corporations are not likely to
be subject to hostile takeovers since their stock is not publicly
traded. Thus, the corporations most likely to benefit from provid-
ing security to its management-efficiently managed public cor-
porations-do not have the ability to avoid the disadvantageous
tax treatment of golden parachute rules through a stockholder
vote which approves the parachute.
285 Morck et al., supra note 32, at 32.
286 Many commentators have noted that golden parachute payments may benefit
stockholders. See, e-g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 75-76 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities,
Firm-Speific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes
1989 DuKE .J. 173, 186 (1989); Richard A. Posner, Law and the Theoy of Finan. Some
Intersections, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159, 166 (1986). However, this view is not shared by
all commentators. See, eg., Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lauers: Legal Skills
and Asset Picing; 94 YALE L.J. 239, 285 n.114 (1984); David W. Leebron, Games Corpora-
tions Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 183 n.105 (1986); Martin
Riger, On Golden Parachutes-Pdpcords or Ripoffs? Some Comments on Special Termination Agree-
ments, 3 PACE L. REv. 15, 39 (1982); Michael Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 110, 149 n.192 (1986).
287 I.R.C. § 1361(b) (West Supp. 1992) generally defines a "small business corpora-
tion" as a corporation which does not have more than 35 shareholders, does not have as
a shareholder a person (other than estates and certain trusts) who is not an individual,
does not have a nonresident alien as a shareholder, and does not have more than one
class of stock.
288 Id- § 280G(b)(5).
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As noted by Professor Zelinsky, the failure of Congress to
permit stockholders of public corporations to approve parachute
payments may "reflect skepticism about the genuineness of
shareholder self governance."289 However, by denying the deduct-
ibility of the payments, Congress has created a tax incentive for
stockholders to monitor the utilization of parachute payments be-
cause the nondeductibility of the payments will adversely affect the
value of the corporation's stock. It seems nonsensical to create an
incentive for stockholder monitoring and then preclude stockhold-
er action which results from the incentive." Instead, it is prefer-
able that the tax treatment of golden parachutes be based on neu-
tral income tax principles. 1
2. Problems with the Greenmail Rules
Analysis of the greenmail provisions also leads to the conclu-
sion that Congress has failed to consider fully the effect of the
separation of ownership from control on management behavior.
The House Committee Report which accompanied the enactment
of section 5881 stated that the greenmail provision was adopted
for the following reasons:
The committee believes that corporate acquisitions that lack
the consent of the acquired corporation are detrimental to the
general economy as well as to the welfare of the acquired
corporation's employees and community. The committee there-
fore believes it is appropriate to create tax disincentives for
such acquisitions. In addition, the committee believes that tax-
payers should be discouraged from realizing short-term profits
by acquiring stock in a public tender offer and later being
redeemed by the corporation in an effort by the corporation to
avert the hostile takeover. 2
Thus, the committee thought that adoption of the greenmall tax
would discourage hostile takeover attempts and would also discour-
age a bidder from bluffing a takeover attempt in order to receive
289 Zelinsky, supra note 280, at 143.
290 Moreover, there is a serious issue as to whether the tax system is an appropriate
mechanism for policing golden parachute payments. See id. at 187-92.
291 &e id. at 163-64. The issue with respect to golden parachute payments under
normal tax principles is whether the payment constitutes unreasonable compensation
which would be nondeductible under Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7 (a) (1958). See Edwin T. Hood
& John J. Benge, Tax Cost of Protecting Executives W en Corporate Ownership Changes Has
Increased, 36 TAX'N FOR ACCT. 92, 92-93 (1986).
292 H.R. REP. No. 3545, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1086 (1987).
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a quick profit from selling the shares it had already acquired to
the target corporation.
93
The greenmail tax reduces the benefit associated with an
aborted takeover attempt.' Thus, in theory, a potential bidder,
in weighing the costs associated with a takeover attempt against
the benefits of either a successful takeover or a greenmail pay-
ment, will reduce the amount of the benefit associated with the
greenmail payments as a result of the tax. All other factors re-
maining unchanged, this reduced benefit is likely to discourage
some takeover attempts which would otherwise have occurred. 95
There is, arguably, a social benefit in deterring hostile take-
overs. While the threat of hostile takeovers marginally restricts
management in achieving its objectives, it is unlikely that the
293 As is the case with golden parachutes, commentators generally disagree about the
propriety of greenmail payments. Some have argued that greenmail payments may be an
appropriate "award" to the people receiving them for identifying inefficient companies.
See, &g., Roger J. Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and GreenmaiL. Is New Legislation Needed?,
19 GA. L REV. 281, 284 (1985); Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical
Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE UJ. 13, 17 (1985). Others argue that the potential
for abuse and the harmful effects of greenmail are too great and, therefore, that it
should be prohibited or curtailed. See, eg., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser,
Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two Models, 96 YALE LJ. 295, 297 (1986); Dennis S.
Karjala, Federalisn, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets in the Interpretation of Federal Secu-
rities Law, 80 Nw. U.L REV. 1473, 1502 n.126 (1986).
294 See Zelinsky, supra note 280, at 174-75.
295 A bidder, in analyzing whether to proceed with a hostile takeover will weigh the
expense of the takeover with the expected benefit. If the present value of the expected
benefit exceeds the present value of the cost, the takeover will be a worthwhile endeavor
from the bidder's perspective. The expected value of the takeover will be the sums of
the values of each possible outcome multiplied by the probability of each outcome. For
example, in a hostile takeover contest there are at least four probable scenarios: (1) a
successful takeover, (2) an aborted takeover with no greenmail and no other takeover
bid, (3) an aborted takeover with greenmail, or (4) an aborted takeover followed by
another bidder making a tender offer. A bidder would assign an expected value (Ev) to
each scenario by multiplying the present value of each outcome (PI, P,2, Pd, Pl) by the
probability (P1 , P2, Ps, P4) of each outcome occurring. In other words the expected value
of each scenario, i.e., scenarios 1 through 4, is calculated as:
Ev.= Pv. (Pn)
where n equals the particular scenario.
The bidder will engage in the takeover if the cost of the takeover C, is less than
the sum of the expected values of the takeover. Thus in our examples the bidder will
engage in the takeover if
C, < E Ev.
Obviously, by reducing the value of Evs, the expected value of an aborted takeover
with a greenmail payment, the overall expected value of the takeover is reduced. Thus,
where the bidder maximizes its profits, a tax on greenmail has the effect of rendering
hostile takeovers marginally less attractive by reducing the potential gain associated with
the takeover.
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threat represents a major deterrent to management excesses.2
Although, on average, corporations subject to hostile takeovers are
less efficient than other companies, 7 the inefficiencies of the
target must be severe before a profit-maximizing bidder will at-
tempt a takeover." s Only then will an opportunity for sufficient
gain to offset the expenses of a takeover exist. In situations where
the target is severely mismanaged, a hostile takeover is an ex-
tremely drastic remedy. It involves a major redeployment of cor-
porate assets and personnel which often severely impacts the
corporation's employees and their community.' A far better
remedy would be one in which the corporation's inefficiencies are
ferreted out at an earlier stage as the result of stockholders effec-
tively monitoring management.
The difficulty with the greenmail rule's attempt to discourage
takeovers, however, is that not all takeover targets are inefficiently
managed corporations. Hostile takeovers may be launched against
very well managed companies. As discussed earlier,' the man-
agement of the bidding companies may desire to acquire well
managed companies in order to achieve their own personal objec-
tives. For example, the bidding company's management may be
seeking to achieve personal objectives such as increased job securi-
ty or an increase in the size of the company in order to justify in-
creased compensation. In those situations, hostile takeovers would
296 Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 281, at 12.
297 Id. at 11. The foregoing study found that the average Tobin's "q" for a simple of
371 firms in the Fortune 500 was .848 while the average Tobin's; "q" for firms from that
sample which were subsequently subject to a hostile takeover was only .524. Because "q"
represents the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of the firm's
physical assets, the study indicates that on average, the poorly managed firms, that is the
firms with a low "q" value, were the firms subject to hostile takeovers. Id.
298 Id. See also DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 41, at 39 ("Only an extraordinary opti-
mist could believe . . . that the current wave of takeover activity is an efficient way to
deal with the organizational deficiencies of American industries."); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Regulating the Market for Corporate Contro" A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1242-43 (1984); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1497-99 (1989) (while threat of
hostile takeovers may cause some managers to be more efficient, the "takeover market
neither adequately aligns the interests of managers and shareholders, nor adequately ad-
dresses the problem of managerial inefficiency."); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 101,
at 202 ("Some hostile takeovers may replace bad managers with new ones . . . . But the
threat of a hostile takeover is unlikely to improve the performance of bad managers.").
299 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract, 78 GEO. LJ.
71, 145-46 (1989); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust In Hostile
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 47-53 (Alan J. Auer-
bach ed., 1988).
300 See supra text accompanying note 283-84.
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harm social welfare if an otherwise well managed company falls
under the control of a less well managed company."'
In the situation where the target company is well managed
and subject to a hostile bid, it would usually benefit social welfare
to permit target's management to in effect bribe the poor man-
agement of the bidding corporation to discontinue the hostile bid
since the greenmail payment would prevent well managed assets
from falling into the wrong hands. 2 However, because of the
greenmail tax, it is less likely that the bidding company would be
amenable to the greenmail payment in exchange for calling off
the bid. Thus, the greenmail tax has the effect of discouraging
profit-maximizing bidders from making hostile bids for inefficient
companies and, at the same time, the tax prevents efficient firms
from thwarting takeover attempts by inefficient firms."3 The bet-
ter method, if hostile takeovers are viewed as inflicting too high a
social cost, is to avoid the situation in which a corporation be-
comes so inefficient that it is subject to a hostile bid. In any event,
the tax laws should not bias the process one way or the other.
VI. CONCLUSION
The preceding sections have shown that tax provisions which
Congress intended to promote a long-term stockholder view or to
motivate management to adopt stockholder objectives are not
successful because management, not the stockholders, control
'public corporations. The failure to appreciate the relative
powerlessness of stockholders in affecting managerial behavior has
resulted in a failure to analyze the potentially harmful impact of a
capital gains preference, and of the golden parachute and
greenmail excise taxes. Similarly, in the case of incentive stock
options, the failure to consider fully the availability of alternative
301 There is some evidence that bidding companies which make poor selections of
target companies are themselves subject to takeovers more frequently than other compa-
nies. Mark L Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets, 98 J. POL
EcoN. 372, 375-76 (1990). However, it is unlikely that such takeovers provide a major
deterrent because of the expense and infrequency of a hostile takeover. Morck et al.,
supra note 32, at 32.
302 See Richard A. Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635,
1662 (1988); Richard A. Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Wdfare and the Limits of
Fiduciary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L REV. 630, 662-63 (1985).
303 See generaly Eric A. Lustig, The Emerging Role of the Federal Tax Law In Regulating
Hostile Corporate Takeover Defenses: The New Section 5881 Excise Tax on Greenmai 40 U. FA-
L REV. 789, 825-27 (1988) (arguing that the greenmail provisions are overinclusive).
1992]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tax incentives for nonqualified options has resulted in manage-
ment obtaining tax "subsidized" stock ownership without comply-
ing with the incentive stock option requirements.
This Article strongly recommends that policymakers fully con-
sider the interaction of the separation of ownership from control
in public corporations with tax provisions intended to increase
productivity or otherwise promote desired stockholder or manage-
ment behavior. For example, this analysis should be incorporated
in determining the best method to alleviate corporate distributions
from a double income tax under some form of corporate tax
integration. It has been noted that a model of full integration,
pursuant to which corporate income would be taxed directly to
stockholders, would provide a strong incentive for stockholders to
inquire about the profitability of projects for which the
corporation's income is retained since stockholders would have to
pay tax on their share of the corporation's income even though
the income was not distributed.' However, as has been dis-
cussed by many authors, full integration may not be practical for a
number of reasons. 5 Consideration of the various forms of par-
tial integration which would relieve corporate dividends from a
double tax without causing stockholders to be taxed on undistrib-
uted corporate income should include an analysis of each form's
impact on stockholder abdication.
Similarly, consideration of stockholder abdication may be
helpful in understanding why entrepreneurs frequently prefer the
corporate form of business despite the tax bias which favors the
use of a partnership whose income is only subject to a single tax.
A recent study has concluded that the disparate tax treatment of
corporations and partnerships play only a minor role in the se-
lection of a form of entity for conducting a business.' The abil-
ity of the management team which started the corporation to
control the corporation even after its percentage of stock own-
304 McCLuRE, supra note 141, at 148. Indeed, management opposed full integration
of corporate taxes during the 1970's for this very reason. See, eg., John K. McNulty, Re-
form of the Individual Income Tax By Integration of the Corporate Income Tax, 46 TAX NOTES
1445, 1446 (1990); Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration, The Proper Way to Eliminate
the Corporate Tax, 27 TAX NOTES 637, 648-39 (1985).
305 See, e.g., MCCLURE, supra note 141, at 146-84; Alvin Warren, The Relation and In-
tegration of Individual and Coporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 719, 740 (1981); Zolt,
supra note 174, at 847 n.41.
306 JEFFRIE K. MACKIE-MASON & ROGER H. GORDON, TAXES AND THE CHOICE OF OR-
GANIZATIONAL FORM (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3781,
1991).
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ership is reduced as a result of the corporation going public may
provide insight into management's motivation in selecting the cor-
porate form despite the unfavorable tax treatment of corporations.

